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ABSTRACT
In Freud’s early formulations regarding a model of the mind, he 
suggested that repressed material functioned in a separate realm of the 
mind which was inaccessible to conscious recall or verbal inquiry.
Based on studies of split-brain patients and studies of the differential 
functioning of the cerebral hemispheres, Galin (1977) has suggested that 
the right cerebral hemisphere may be the locus of unconscious mental 
contents.
Research with patient populations and normals has shown that 
each cerebral hemisphere is specialized for a different cognitive style. 
Right hemisphere cognition is similar in many respects to primary pro­
cess thinking: global, nonverbal, imaginal, nonlinear association, non- 
propositional speech, less concerned with perception of sequence and 
time. Other data which suggests that the right hemisphere may be impli­
cated in repressed mental contents comes from research on the dissocia­
tion of mental contents of the two hemispheres in commissurotomy (split- 
brain) patients.
Galin (1977) has proposed that in normal intact individuals the 
mental events of the right hemisphere can become disconnected function­
ally (repressed) from the left hemisphere by inhibition of neuronal 
transmission across the cerebral commissures. Recent evidence regarding 
differential hemispheric functioning during anxiety suggests another 
mechanism that may result in repression. Tucker, Antes, Stenslie and
x
Barnhardt (1978) have found that when subjects are anxious the left 
cerebral hemisphere becomes overactive but dysfunctional. The neuro­
psychological model proposed in the present paper suggests that "repres­
sion" is a function of this restricted perception during anxiety. 
According to the model, when an unconscious conflict is aroused, the 
ensuing anxiety serves to overactivate and render dysfunctional the left 
hemisphere. As a result, perception and processing proceed along right 
hemisphere lines. Because of their special modes of organization, the 
knowledge of one hemisphere may not translate readily into the language 
of the other. Thus, the information stored in the right hemisphere 
while the left was dysfunctional may not be readily accessible to con­
scious, verbal left hemisphere thought. As a result, this information 
may remain "repressed" in the right hemisphere.
The present study attempted a first step in the evaluation of 
this formulation by evaluating whether left hemisphere perception/ 
processing is hampered more by anxiety than is right hemisphere 
perception/processing when material is presented simultaneously to both 
hemispheres. To evaluate the effects of anxiety high and low trait 
anxious subjects were employed. The effects of state anxiety were stud­
ied by experimentally induced arousal. Subjects were asked to perform 
tasks which require either predominantly left or predominantly right 
hemisphere functioning and a task that combines both analytic (left 
hemisphere) and global (right hemisphere) features.
It was hypothesized that under conditions of increased anxiety, 
performance on left hemisphere tasks would be more negatively affected 
than would performance on right hemisphere tasks. Contrary to
xi
prediction, right hemisphere task performance actually declined signifi­
cantly more under conditions of increased anxiety than did left hemi­
sphere task performance. Also contrary to prediction, performance on 
the analytic (left hemisphere) aspect of the combined task improved sig­
nificantly with increased anxiety whereas there was a nonsignificant 
decline in performance on the global (right hemisphere) aspect of the 
task with increased anxiety. Findings are discussed in terms of recip­
rocal inhibition of hemispheric function, cognitive style and state 
dependent memory phenomena.
xii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Repression, the exclusion from conscious awareness of unaccept­
able thoughts or impulses, has been the cornerstone of psychodynamic 
theory since its inception. Recently, primarily in the last 20 years, 
research on the function of the cerebral hemispheres of the brain has 
suggested that there may be a neuropsychological basis for at least some 
instances of repression. The present study seeks to provide a model for 
repression based on differential hemispheric functioning and to evalu­
ate experimentally elements of this model.
First, a brief history of hemispheric specialization as a 
research field will be provided. Experimental methods employed in this 
area will then be explored and an overviex^ given of findings in major 
subdivisions of hemispheric function research. The areas covered will 
include cognition/perception, emotion, and differences among individu- • 
als with characteristic eye movement patterns. Data relating repression 
to differential hemispheric functioning will then be explored and a 
neuropsychological model will be offered for this phenomenon.
Historical Perspective
As the cerebral cortex has evolved and expanded, the mental 
abilities of mammalian forms have become more complex and sophisticated.
1
2Thus in the creature possessing evolution's most highly developed intel­
lect— man— we find the most massive cortex. In order that this mass may 
fit into the human cranium, the cortex has become convoluted and folded. 
These convolutions and folds subdivide the cortex into lobes. The cor­
tex is also divided down the rostral-caudal midline by a deep fissure. 
The resultant right and left cerebral hemispheres are held together by 
connective tissues, the principal ones comprising the corpus callosum 
(Dimond, 1974).
Each of the cerebral hemispheres exerts its primary influence 
over the opposite or contralateral half of the body and also receives 
most of its information from the contralateral side. The tactual and 
motor systems operate almost exclusively in contralateral fashion. Sen­
sations and movement of the left half of the body are mediated by the 
right hemisphere while those of the right half of the body are mediated 
by the left hemisphere. Vision to the right of a central fixation point 
is mediated by the left half of the brain whereas vision to the left of 
fixation is mediated by the right hemisphere. Each hemisphere receives 
auditory input from both ears; however, the connections with the contra­
lateral ear appear to be stronger than the ipsilateral connections 
(Kimura, 1973).
The separation of the cerebrum into two distinct cortices, privy 
to different funds of information, has led investigators to wonder if 
man in effect has twin brains, with each cerebral hemisphere duplicating 
the functions of the other, or if the cerebral hemispheres provide dif­
ferent contributions to mental functioning. According to Searleman 
(1977), the view that the cerebral hemispheres are specialized in
3function received support as early as the 1800's with Dax's 1836 paper 
to the French Medical Society linking right hemiplegia and loss of 
speech to lesions of the left hemisphere. Then in the 1860's Broca lent 
further support to the specialization view when he demonstrated that 
damage to the third frontal convolution of the left hemisphere resulted 
in a motor speech aphasia whereas damage to the same area of the right 
hemisphere did not (Searleman, 1977). In their experiments in the 
1950's with cats and monkeys, Roger Sperry and R. E. Meyers had shown 
that doubling (i.e., separation) of mental streams follows cerebral dis­
connection. Their studies demonstrated that following surgical discon­
nection of the hemispheres, if one hemisphere learns a discrimination, 
the other hemisphere does not have access to that knowledge. Despite 
the early studies suggesting separate streams of mental activity in the 
hemispheres, research in hemispheric specialization did not truly blos­
som until the work of Sperry and his colleagues with human patients at 
the California Institute of Technology (Galin, 1977).
Patient Populations
Sperry's research involved neurosurgical patients, all advanced 
epileptics in whom the midline section of the corpus callosum, anterior 
and hippocampal commissures and, in some cases, the massa intermedia was 
performed in order to contain severe epileptic seizures which had not 
responded to medication. Because this surgery prevents the interhemi- 
spheric communication which normally occurs by way of the corpus 
callosum, these human commissurotomy or "split-brain" patients provided 
an ideal opportunity for studying the functions of each cerebral
4hemisphere in isolation (Sperry, 1968). While Sperry and his colleagues 
have published more than 100 studies of their patients, two main find­
ings have emerged, that the two hemispheres in man are specialized for 
different cognitive functions and that each hemisphere of the "split- 
brain" appears capable of sustaining an independent autonomous 
consciousness (Galin, 1977).
Information regarding hemispheric specialization has come from a 
variety of other sources. Two additional patient populations contribut­
ing to knowledge in the area are individuals who have suffered lesions 
confined to a single hemisphere and patients who receive unilateral 
carotid sodium amytal injections. Deficits or aberrations of particular 
cognitive and emotional functions of brain-lesioned patients are gener­
ally taken as evidence that these functions were subserved, prior to 
damage, by the now lesioned hemisphere. A similar interpretation has 
been given to observations of sodium amytal patients. The sodium amytal 
or Wada test involves injecting the sedative sodium amytal into the 
carotid artery of one or the other side of the neck. This results in 
disruption of the functioning of the cerebral hemisphere on the same 
side. The Wada test is used prior to neurosurgery to determine which 
hemisphere has speech representation and to avoid, where possible, sur­
gical destruction of the speech area. Results of the lesion and sodium 
amytal studies have generally been interpreted as indicating that 
decreased functioning of the involved hemisphere permits the character­
istic functioning of the unaffected hemisphere to come to the fore.
Some investigators (e.g., Hall, Hall, & Lavoie, 1968), however, have 
suggested that the behavior of patients with damage to a single
5hemisphere is the result of the lesion or sedative exaggerating the 
characteristic functioning of the affected cerebral hemisphere. This is 
supported by the findings of Alema, Rosadini and Rossi (1961) that in 
patients with unilateral brain damage, the specifically lateralized 
affective response to amytal injection is seen only on the intact side.
While no one would deny the contributions to the area of hemi­
spheric specialization made by studies of neurological patients, find­
ings based on brain damage must be viewed with caution. Dimond (1974) 
points out that brain damage might feasibly disrupt a function only at 
particular levels of organization. Furthermore, due to the brain's tre­
mendous capacity to quickly compensate for impairment, changes in behav­
ior following injury may be the result not only of the damage incurred 
but of compensatory processes. Data from commissurotomy patients is 
suspect because some effects could be due to preoperative conditions 
arising from the patient's epilepsy (R. E. Gur & R. C. Gur, 1977).
Research Techniques with the 
Neurologically Intact
Because of the limitations of research with patient populations 
many investigators have turned to the study of normal individuals to 
elucidate hemispheric functions. Two techniques utilized in research 
with normal subjects (tachistoscopic and dichotic listening methodolo­
gies) have capitalized on the fact that information presented to one- 
half of the body travels first to the contralateral hemisphere. Thus, 
visual information to the left of a fixation point is received by the 
right one-half of each retina; then neural pathways from the right 
halves of both retinae go to the visual cortex of the right hemisphere.
6Similarly, information to the right of fixation is received by the left 
side of each retina and travels from there to the left hemisphere.
Under normal viewing conditions, however, one cannot present an image in 
only one visual field because the eyes are constantly moving. But using 
rapid tachistoscopic presentations of stimuli to the left or right of 
fixation at durations less than the 200 msec required for eye movement 
effectively results in stimulation of only one side of each retina (and 
therefore a single hemisphere). Therefore, if responses are more rapid 
and fewer errors are made in processing particular kinds of information 
when presented tachistoscopically to one or the other visual field, it 
can be deduced that the contralateral hemisphere is specialized in deal­
ing with such material. A stimulus presented to the unspecialized hemi­
sphere is considered at a disadvantage because it either must be handled 
less efficiently by that hemisphere or must travel via the corpus 
callosum to the specialized hemisphere for processing (Springer, 1977).
Kinsbourne (1970) and White (1971) have given alternative expla­
nations for visual field superiority effects but their arguments have 
been effectively refuted in an article by Berlucchi (1974) . According 
to Kinsbourne, laterality effects in perception can be attributed to an 
attentional bias toward the visual field that subserves the specialized 
hemisphere rather than to more efficient transmission of information by 
the shorter (contralateral) pathway to that hemisphere. For example, if 
a subject is involved in a study of visual discrimination of verbal 
material, Kinsbourne would argue that because of this task set, the left 
hemisphere becomes activated in "anticipation" of the verbal material. 
This left hemisphere activation would then trigger selective attention
7to the right or even a shift in gaze to the right prior to the presenta­
tion of task stimuli. Since the subject is already attending to the 
right, he will be at an advantage when stimuli are presented in the 
right visual field. Berlucchi, however, presented letter (left hemi­
sphere material) and facial (right hemisphere material) stimuli in ran­
dom order so that subjects could not anticipate the type of material to 
be viewed. Right visual half-field (RVHF) superiority for letters and 
left visual half-field (LVHF) superiority for faces was still found.
This argues against the attentional bias hypothesis.
White (1971) has argued that RVHF superiority for letters is 
explicable on grounds other than left hemispheric specialization for 
speech and language. He found that right field superiority for identi­
fication of the orientation of lines presented at four different angles 
(0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees) was significantly correlated with, right- 
field superiority for letters in the same subjects. White concluded 
that right field superiority for identification of both line orientation 
and letters can be attributed to a selective contouring apparatus which 
favors these stimuli at a peripheral retinal or central level shown in 
the right visual hemifield rather than attributing the right field 
superiority to left cerebral hemispheric specialization for language. 
Umilta, Rizzolatti, Marzi, Zamboni, Franzini, Camarda, and Berlucchi 
(1973) also found RVHF superiority when rectangles were presented in the 
orientations used by White. However, in two additional experiments 
where line orientation was changed to 30, 45, 120 and 135 degrees from 
the vertical in one study and 15, 45 and 60 degrees from the vertical in 
the other, LVHF superiority was demonstrated. Berlucchi (1974)
8interprets these data in a way that is consistent with the idea that 
line orientation and letter recognition are facilitated by the left 
hemisphere language areas. He suggests that the four line orientations 
used by White are recognized and responded to more rapidly when pre­
sented to the RVHF because these orientations are readily analyzed and 
categorized by the left hemisphere in language terms, i.e., horizontal, 
vertical, left tilt, right tilt. The rectangles that Umilta and his 
colleagues used at other orientations would be more difficult to encode 
singly by way of verbal labels. However, they could be encoded on a 
comparison basis with the other stimuli. Thus the right hemisphere, 
adept at analyzing spatial relations, would better handle these discrim­
inations .
The dichotic listening procedure is used with auditory stimula­
tion. The auditory system differs from the visual in that each hemi­
sphere receives information from both ears (Kimura, 1973) . As a result, 
monaural presentation of material does not permit lateralization to 
only one hemisphere. With the dichotic listening procedure different 
information is provided simultaneously to each ear via headphones. This 
procedure does appear to accomplish lateralization of input. Under such 
conditions of competition it appears that the ipsilateral pathways are 
suppressed leaving only the contralateral pathways functional (Springer, 
1977). Another research tool used with normal as well as patient popu­
lations is the electroencephalograph (EEG). Scalp EEG activity is 
recorded over the two cerebral hemispheres or over particular regions of 
the cerebral cortex during mental activities that are thought to result 
in differential activation. When comparing the EEGs of two sites,
9greater alpha desynchrony is thought to indicate greater activation.
Data from several investigators (e.g., Galin & Ornstein, 1972; McKee, 
Humphrey, & McAdam, 1973) support the use of the EEG as a means for 
studying hemispheric specialization.
The observation that individuals tend to shift their gaze to the 
left or right during contemplation or while speaking has been the basis 
for another measure of hemispheric activation useful with normal popula­
tions. These lateral eye movements (LEMs) are controlled by activity in 
the frontal eye fields and in 1969 Bakan suggested that movements to the 
left or right are triggered by greater activation of the contralateral 
cerebral hemisphere. If this were the case, questions thought to elicit 
left hemisphere processes should produce LEMs to the right while ques­
tions triggering right hemisphere processes should result in eye move­
ments to the left (Kinsbourne, 1972). Data have been equivocal in this 
regard (see review by Ehrlichman & Weinberger, 1978). Greater replica­
bility has been found in studies investigating individual differences in 
primary direction of lateral eye movements. Subjects have been found to 
be reasonably consistent in their pattern of eye movements within and 
between sessions and in different situations so that a large portion of 
individuals can be classified as left movers (LMs) or right movers 
(RMs). In addition, LMs and RMs have been found to differ on a number 
of personality variables and individual characteristics. However, the 
relationship between these variables and differing functions of the two 
hemispheres has not always been clear. More importantly LMs and RMs 
cannot always be distinguished on the basis of functions held to be left 
or right hemisphere specific. In a recent article G. Tucker and Suib
10
(1978) suggest that former negative findings regarding LM/RM differences 
in processing hemisphere specific material may have been due to inade­
quate experimental controls. They compared WAIS Verbal and Performance 
IQs of RMs and LMs but only used as subjects those individuals who had 
been consistently classified as LMs or RMs on two occasions. As would 
be expected by Bakan's contralateral activation hypothesis, RMs obtained 
significantly higher Verbal IQs than Performance IQs, and LMs obtained 
higher Performance IQs.
Overview of Research
Thus far attention has been directed at the development of inter­
est in hemispheric specialization, patient populations that have pro­
vided data regarding the differential functioning of the cerebral hemi­
spheres, and research techniques that have been employed with normal sub­
jects. Now an overview of research findings in this area will be pre­
sented. Data presented throughout this paper are limited to right 
handed subjects. In most right handed subjects language functions, par­
ticularly speech production, are controlled by the left hemisphere. The 
picture is less clear with subjects who are not right handed and for 
this reason they are treated separately in the literature. About two- 
thirds of non-right handed subjects also exhibit left hemisphere speech 
but the remainder have either right hemisphere language or bilateral 
representation for language skills (Searleman, 1977).
Cognition/Perception. Springer (1977) has provided an excellent 
review of findings regarding hemispheric specialization for cognitive 
and perceptual functions. In terms of these functions, the left
11
hemisphere is specialized for analytic processes such as the perception 
and production of speech, language and digits. The right hemisphere is 
adept at holistic processing tasks such as music perception and visuo- 
spatial performance. The latter includes visual point location, rapid 
scanning of visual stimuli for enumeration, perception of line orienta­
tion, stereoscopic depth perception (Kimura, 1974), identification of 
many sided regular polygonal forms and face recognition. Most early 
researches emphasized verbal versus nonverbal input and focused on dif­
ferential processing of the two hemispheres for different kinds of stim­
uli. For example, the early finding of better identification of letters 
flashed to the right visual field was interpreted as indicative of the 
interaction of the verbal processor of the left hemisphere with verbal 
stimuli. Stimuli that were more readily processed by the right hemi­
sphere included faces (Springer, 1977), many-sided polygons (Umilta, 
Bagnara, & Simion, 1978) and melodies (Kimura, 1973) . Springer goes on 
to note that more recent research in hemisphere asymmetries of cogni­
tion and perception has focused on task requirements rather than type of 
stimuli per se. For example, based on characteristics of the stimuli, 
word matching would be considered a left hemisphere task; however, a 
right hemisphere advantage for word matching has been shown when sub­
jects could respond solely on the basis of the physical characteristics 
of the stimuli rather than the meaning. Although visual configurational 
stimuli are generally considered the province of the right hemisphere, 
Umilta et al. (1978) found a right visual field (left hemisphere) advan­
tage in recognition of simple geometric forms (e.g., triangles and 
squares), probably because these stimuli readily lend themselves to
12
verbal labelling. Springer also reports an unpublished study by John 
Niederbuhl in which opposite hemisphere superiorities were obtained for 
identification of the same letter stimuli when different task instruc­
tions were given. A left hemisphere superiority was found when subjects 
were to rehearse a set of letters verbally and identify those visually 
presented stimuli that were set members. Right hemisphere advantage was 
demonstrated when subjects did not engage in verbal rehearsal and were 
to identify only those letters composed of straight lines.
Not only task requirements but also response mode is important 
to consider when evaluating findings regarding hemispheric specializa­
tion. In a 1971 study by Geffen, Bradshaw, and Wallace briefer response 
latencies were found for ambiguous face stimuli presented to the LVHF 
when manual same/different responses were required. Reaction times were 
the same for LVHF and RVHF presentations when vocal yes/no responses 
were required. Each hemisphere should be able to respond equally well 
manually so that any differences in reaction time with manual responding 
can be attributed to hemisphere asymmetry for the particular task.
Vocal responses must be made by the left hemisphere. Faces presented to 
the LVHF are processed in the right hemisphere but reaction times 
increase because the information must then cross over to the left hemi­
sphere for vocal response. With RVHF presentations of faces crossover 
is not required for verbal response, however, reaction times are slowed 
since the left hemisphere is not specialized for processing faces. A 
mutual cancellation occurs with no advantage found for field of presen­
tation. Geffen et al. further found that reaction times were similar
with left and right field presentations when a non-identificatory vocal
13
response (saying "bonk" rather than the name of the digit) was required. 
RVHF superiority was also found when a manual identificatory response 
was required, e.g., pushing a lever to one side for a number 2 and push­
ing it to the other side for a number 4. Geffen et al. conclude it is 
not necessarily the verbal versus manual nature of a response which is 
critical but rather that it is important to clarify if the response mode 
is identificatory, presumably the type of response mediated by the left 
hemisphere.
Emotion. Research findings of hemispheric specialization for 
cognitive and perceptual functions have stimulated research to determine 
whether there are differential hemispheric contributions to emotion. 
According to Gainotti (1972) Goldstein in 1939 was the first investi­
gator to notice the occurrence of catastrophic emotional reaction in 
left brain damaged patients. Then in 1951 Hecaen, Ajuriaguerra, and 
Massonet and in 1952 Denny-Brown, Meyer and Hornstein noted the emo­
tional reaction of indifference among patients with damage to the non­
dominant (for speech) hemisphere. Gainotti goes on to report that in 
1959 Terzian and Ceccotto made similar discoveries regarding patients 
who received sodium amytal injections: a depressive-catastrophic reac­
tion was noted as the inactivating effects of amytal carotid injection 
on the side of the dominant hemisphere were wearing off; an euphoric- 
manic reaction was noted while patients recovered from amytal injection 
to the carotid on the side of the non-dominant hemisphere. In a study 
of 150 patients with unilateral cerebral lesions Gainotti (1969) lent 
further support to this finding when he found a significantly higher 
incidence of catastrophic reactions in left-lesioned patients and
14
significantly more indifference reactions among the right lesioned. 
Gainotti (1972) explored this phenomenon further by giving a total of 
160 brain damaged patients a battery of neuropsychological tests in 
order to evaluate their reactions to failures. Among the left lesioned 
there were significantly more catastrophic reactions or anxious- 
depressive reactions while the right lesioned were more likely to 
respond with anosognosia, indifference, or joking. In a study of tempo­
ral lobe epileptics Bear and Fedio (1977) found those with right hemi­
sphere involvement exaggerated their positive qualities and those with 
left hemisphere involvement minimized their positive qualities; the 
reverse was true for undesirable traits. Although right temporal lobe 
epileptics tended to minimize or deny sadness, they were actually rated 
by observers as more sad than the left temporal lobe epileptics who gave 
self-reports of greater sadness.
Based on data regarding the emotional functioning of patients 
with brain dysfunction, one would expect left and right damaged indi­
viduals to have different MMPI profiles. In a 1977 paper presented to 
the International Neuropsychological Society, Gasparrini, Satz, and 
Heilman (Note 1) reviewed studies which compared the MMPI profiles of 
such patients and found that none of the investigators successfully dif­
ferentiated left and right damaged groups. However, in a research study 
of their own replicating methodologically an earlier investigation by 
Reitan, Gasparrini et al. did find significant differences on Scale 2 
(depression). Left damaged subjects scored significantly more often in 
the pathological range on this scale than did right damaged subjects.
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As stated earlier, the usual interpretation given to data 
resulting from studies of the emotional responses of unilateral brain 
dysfunction patients is that when one hemisphere is rendered dysfunc­
tional, it is unable to inhibit the function of the unaffected side of 
the brain. The suggestion is made then that the depressive-catastrophic 
reaction of the left hemisphere dysfunction patients is indicative of 
the unhindered right hemisphere's contribution to emotionality. Con­
versely, the euphoric indifference seen in right dysfunction is con­
sidered the reflection of left hemisphere emotionality. However, a 
study reported by Hall et al. (1968) suggests the opposite may hold 
true, that depressive-catastrophic responses may be due to exaggeration 
of the normal mode of function of the left hemisphere, and indifference- 
euphoric reactions may be due to exaggerated right hemisphere function. 
These investigators evaluated the Rorschach responses of left and right 
damaged patients and found the former to be constricted and inhibited 
and the latter expansive and unconstrained. They argued that these 
characteristic response styles are exaggerations of the cognitive styles 
of the intact left and right cerebral hemispheres. This type of exag­
geration of the cognitive function characteristic of the damaged hemi­
sphere could feasibly occur for the emotional functioning specific to 
the damaged side as well. Gainotti (1972) provides the disparate inter­
pretation that the catastrophic depressive reaction is an appropriate 
emotional response (by the right hemisphere) to the realization that 
deficits have been incurred by the left hemisphere damage and that the 
indifference-euphoric response is an abnormal mood reaction that occurs 
when the emotion-mediating right hemisphere is damaged. Bear and Fedio
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(1977) provide a somewhat similar view of the catastrophic reaction.
They suggest that the emotional responses accompanying left and right 
hemisphere dysfunction result from information that is available to the 
"conscious, verbal" left hemisphere. Deficits in cognitive or in verbal- 
emotional associations within the dysfunctional left hemisphere will be 
readily apparent to the conscious verbal inquiry of this hemisphere and 
then may be exaggerated catastrophically. With right hemisphere lesions, 
however, they suggest the dysfunctional right hemisphere is unable to 
provide information regarding its sensory, cognitive or affective defi­
cits. In response, the left hemisphere interprets the lack of informa­
tion as a sign that there are no problems. Indifference or euphoria is 
the result.
Lezak (Note 2), in a report on right hemisphere damaged patients, 
attributed the aberrations of affect they display to defects in the 
right hemisphere^ synthesizing and configurational processing. Several 
research findings from studies of subjects without brain dysfunction 
provide support for the role of the right hemisphere in emotion.
Schwartz, Davidson, and Maer (1975) devised 40 questions involving emo­
tional and nonemotional stimuli in different combinations. They found 
significantly more left LEMs on the emotional than the nonemotional 
questions, indicating greater right hemisphere activation when presented 
with emotional material. Safer and Leventhal (1977) found that subjects 
who were presented with taped passages to the left ear used emotional 
tone of voice rather than content in rating the passages as positive, 
neutral or negative. They interpreted this finding as indicating a 
right hemisphere bias for utilization of emotional cues. Sackeim,
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R. C. Gur, and Saucy (1978) found that the left side of the face 
expresses emotion more intensely than the right side, a finding which 
suggests greater right hemispheric involvement in the production of emo­
tional expression.
Tucker, Stenslie, Roth, and Shearer (in press) reported that 
investigators (Flor-Henry, 1976; Yozawitz & Bruder, Note 3) have found 
right hemisphere performance decrements in psychiatric patients with 
affective disorders, while EEG research (d'Elia & Perris, 1973, 1974) 
has suggested greater left than right hemisphere activation in de­
pressed patients. Other support for greater left hemisphere activation 
during depression comes from EEG studies by Harmon and Ray (1977) and 
Ehrlichman and Wiener (Note 4). Tucker et al. (in press) performed two 
experiments to evaluate the relative contributions of the left and right 
hemispheres to emotion. In the first experiment differential hemi­
spheric functioning was demonstrated in normal subjects during hypnot­
ically induced mood states. While left hemisphere performance (on an 
arithmetic task) was unaffected by mood states, right hemisphere perfor­
mance decrements (in imagery) were demonstrated during induced depres­
sion. Greater right than left auditory attentional bias was also demon­
strated during the induced depression condition. However, it was 
unclear if this difference was a function of the left hemisphere becom­
ing more activated or if it was due to the right hemisphere becoming 
less activated during depressive mood. To clarify the issue of differ­
ential hemispheric activation during emotion, Tucker et al. (in press) 
performed a second experiment to evaluate the EEGs of subjects taken 
while they used suggestions offered by the experimenter to arouse a
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depressed mood state. Rather than simply evaluating left versus right 
activation, Tucker et al. also looked at differential activation 
along the rostral-caudal dimension. EEG data were obtained from the 
left and right frontal, central, parietal and occipital regions of the 
cortex. In contrast to previous EEG research findings, greater right 
over left activation was found in the induced depressive states, with 
this differential activation being specific to the frontal lobes. Sub­
jects were also asked to perform cognitive tasks (imagery and arith­
metic) and the typical right/left differences in activation found on 
these tasks were found to be specific to the occipital lobes. Tucker et 
al. suggest that it is right frontal lobe activation (rather than left 
hemisphere activation) which inhibits cognitive performance in the right 
posterior region during depression. While there was greater right than 
left frontal lobe activation during depression, relative symmetry of the 
left and right frontal EEG's was found during the euphoria condition.
Additional studies of hemispheric functioning in emotion have 
evaluated differential contributions of the left and right cerebral 
hemispheres to the arousal and inhibition of positive and negative 
affect, to stress, and to anxiety. In a study of normal college stu­
dents Shearer and Tucker (in press) presented subjects with sexual and 
aversive slides under instructions to either facilitate or inhibit emo­
tional arousal. While there was a slight non-significant right ear 
(left hemisphere) attentional bias across conditions, success in facili­
tating the experience of aversive arousal and failure to inhibit experi­
enced aversive arousal were accompanied by relatively greater left ear 
attentional bias (right hemisphere activation). However, this greater
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right hemisphere activation and greater experienced aversive arousal 
were accompanied by less physical arousal. Shearer and Tucker also 
found that subjects tended to use right hemisphere-type cognitive strate­
gies (imagery, nonverbal, global) to facilitate emotional arousal and 
used left hemisphere-type cognition (internal verbal dialogue, analytic, 
non-imagery) when trying to inhibit emotion.
In a 1977 experiment designed to study the effects of psycho­
logical stress upon the- hemisphere activation of normal subjects, Tucker, 
Roth, Arneson, and Buckingham observed LEMs in response to emotional and 
nonemotional reflective questions. Subjects were subjected to either a 
neutral or stress condition; the latter was induced by telling subjects 
their answers would indicate their intellectual ability and personality 
stability. As in previous studies there were significantly more left 
LEMs (implying greater right hemisphere activation) to emotional than to 
nonemotional questions. Left movers and right movers showed a signifi­
cant increase in left LEMs during stress whereas this increase was non­
significant for individuals who showed about equal numbers of left and 
right LEMs. Both males and females demonstrated increased left LEMs for 
emotional questions in the stress condition, but this was significant 
for males only with stress and for females only for emotional questions.
Tucker, Antes, Stenslie, and Barnhardt (1978) report two experi­
ments on the relationship between anxiety and hemispheric functioning.
In Experiment I they found that higher state anxiety (induced by convey­
ing to subjects that they were the focal point in a sophisticated, high- 
pressure research project and measured with the Spielberger State Anxi­
ety Questionnaire) was associated with more errors in the RVHF,
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especially for verbal stimuli, but did not affect errors in the LVHF. 
Only extreme scorers were used in the study, i.e., those subjects who 
scored at least one standard deviation above or below the mean on the 
state anxiety questionnaire. As a result of this selection process the 
investigators may have been examining trait anxiety by way of the state 
measure (Tucker, Note 5). In a second experiment, higher trait anxiety 
was associated with greater right ear auditory attention bias (left 
hemisphere activation), a decrease in LLEMs and no change in RLEMs. 
Tucker et al. interpret their findings as indicating that with anxiety 
the left hemisphere becomes both overactivated and dysfunctional.
Another area of research in differential hemispheric functioning 
pertains to both emotional and cognitive functioning. This is research 
on differential hemispheric functioning in schizophrenia. Beaumont and 
Dimond (1973) found that schizophrenics had difficulty on matching tasks 
when the material to be matched was presented in two hemispheres (inter- 
hemispheric matching). They also had problems with intrahemispheric 
matching in the left cerebral hemisphere but only with letter stimuli. 
These findings are suggestive of left hemisphere dysfunction in schizo­
phrenia. Louks, Calsyn, and Lindsay (1976) found that patients demon­
strating left hemisphere deficits on neuropsychological testing tended 
to score in the psychotic range on the MMPI while patients with right 
hemisphere deficit tended to score in the neurotic range. Lansdell and 
Urbach (1965) found higher scores on the F and 8 (schizophrenia) scales 
of the MMPI with left temporal lobe epileptics when compared to right 
temporal lobe epileptics. Additional research supporting a connection 
between left hemisphere dysfunction and schizophrenia includes EEG
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studies by Rochford, Swartzburg, Chowdhrey, and Goldstein (1976) and by 
Flor-Henry (1976). Rochford et al. compared left and right hemisphere 
EEG amplitude variances and found in depression much greater variability 
in the right hemisphere and with a group of schizophrenics greater vari­
ability in the left hemisphere. Their findings were interpreted as 
indicative of left hemisphere dysfunction in schizophrenics. Flor-Henry 
found EEG abnormalities in both schizophrenic and psychopathic patients 
which suggest disorganization in the orbital frontal-temporal regions of 
the left hemisphere.
Bazhin, Wasserman, and Tonkonogii (1975) have compared subgroup­
ings of schizophrenics: paranoid schizophrenics x^ ho were experiencing 
auditory hallucinations versus non-hallucinating paranoid schizophrenics 
They found increased right ear thresholds with the hallucinating group 
of patients. In a study of 19 schizophrenics, Gruzelier and Hammond 
(1976) found differences between these patients and a group of normals 
on four measures of hemispheric functioning. These included an 
initially higher right ear sensitivity, then gradually increasing right 
ear auditory thresholds for the schizophrenics. The patients also demon 
strated poorer right ear auditory temporal discrimination, increased 
electrodermal orienting responses to tones on the right side and poorer 
performances on WAIS verbal subtests as compared with spatial subtests.
R. E. Gur (1978) and Schweitzer, Becker, and Welsh (1978) have 
used LEMs to measure hemispheric functioning in schizophrenics. R. E. 
Gur first found that, unlike the controls, the schizophrenics showed 
right hemisphere superiority on both spatial and verbal tests, suggest­
ing left hemisphere dysfunction with verbal material. In a second
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study, LEMs were measured in response to reflective questions (verbal 
neutral, verbal emotional). Schizophrenics made significantly more 
right LEMs compared to controls regardless of type of question. Results 
of the two studies are interpreted as indicating both left hemisphere 
overactivation and left hemisphere dysfunction in schizophrenia. 
Schweitzer et al. compared LEMs of schizophrenics and normal controls in 
response to verbal nonemotional, verbal emotional, spatial nonemotional 
and spatial emotional stimuli and found significantly more right LEMs 
for schizophrenics overall and on three of the sets of stimuli (verbal 
nonemotional, verbal emotional and spatial emotional) which is also 
indicative of left hemisphere overactivation in these patients.
Left Movers Versus Right Movers. A large body of research in 
the area of hemispheric functioning has involved the comparison of left 
movers (lookers) and right movers (lookers). These are individuals 
whose eye movement responses to reflective questions are primarily in 
one direction. The interpretation is generally given that left movers 
(LMs) tend to rely more on their right hemisphere in their mental func­
tioning while right movers (RMs) rely on their left hemisphere to a 
greater extent.
Day in 1964 was the first to make the observation in his work 
with clinical patients that individuals are rather consistent in direc­
tion of eye movements. He described differences in the type of anxiety 
experienced by LM and RM patients as well as differences in EEG records 
(1967a) and attentional patterns (1967b). Day (1967b) described RMs as 
exhibiting an externalized actively responsive distribution of attention 
emphasizing the visual haptic modes while LMs demonstrated an
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internalized, subjective, passive distribution of attention in which 
they were more reactive to auditory and subjective visceral experience. 
RMs tended to describe their anxiety as having an external locus and 
their behavior emphasized visual alertness to changes in the environ­
ment. The anxiety of LMs was described as having an internal locus with 
tension felt when internal impulses threatened to emerge. In a 1968 
article, Day reported that LMs tend to be more emotional than RMs.
Some of Day's observations have been corroborated by more recent 
research. Miskin and Singer (1974) found that high inner attentive sub­
jects were more likely to be LMs. It has been found that LMs are more 
susceptible to hypnosis (Bakan, 1969; R. C. Gur & R. E. Gur, 1974) and 
to persuasion (Ehrlichman & Weinberger, 1978). However, in a study of 
hypnotic susceptibility, R. E. Gur and Reyher (1973) found that active 
induction methods reduced the susceptibility of the LMs. They interpret­
ed this as indicating that these individuals are more internally ori­
ented, an interpretation that is congruent with Day's early observations. 
In her doctoral dissertation, R. E. Gur (1973) found that LMs reported 
more psychosomatic symptoms than did RMs which is in line with Day's ob­
servation that LMs internalize anxiety. R. E. Gur also found that LMs 
used reversal as a defensive strategy more than did RMs while RMs used 
turning against object and projection to a greater extent. Again commen­
surate with Day's observations and corroborating R. E. Gur's disserta­
tion findings, R. E. Gur and R. C. Gur (1975) found LMs to score higher 
on a defense mechanism cluster that included repression and denial 
whereas RMs scored higher on defenses of projection and turning against 
others. Gerdes and Kinsbourne (1974) used pulse rate to measure anxiety
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and found that LMs underestimated their level of anxiety. This is con­
gruent with the use of repression and denial as defensive strategies.
RMs were found to overestimate their anxiety level.
Smokier and Shevrin (1979) reasoned that qualities marking a 
hysterical personality style (repression of disturbing ideas, emotional 
lability, a concrete, stimulus-bound cognitive approach) are consistent 
with research findings regarding right hemisphere functioning and that 
obsessive compulsive personality traits (repression of disturbing 
affect, almost exclusive use of an ideational approach, logico-deductive 
cognitive approach) are consistent with research data regarding left 
hemisphere functioning. Their hypotheses that hysterical style would be 
correlated with left looking and obsessive compulsive style with right 
looking were borne out.
In a two part study of eye movement tendencies and psycho­
pathology, R. E. Gur, R. C. Gur, and Marshalek (1975) first observed 
classroom seating preferences and found that LMs tended to sit on the 
right side of the classroom and RMs on the left side. In a followup 
investigation they found that male students who sit on the left side of 
the room (presumably RMs) when compared with students with a right side 
of the room seating preference give self-reports of more psychopathology. 
Female students who sit on the left side of the classroom (presumably 
RMs) report less psychopathology than females who sit on the right side 
of the room.
In evaluations of LM/RM differences in achievement and in intel­
lectual vocational orientation, Bakan (1969) found that RM college stu­
dents scored higher on the quantitative than the verbal section of the
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Scholastic Aptitude Test and that LMs preferred "soft" over "hard" aca­
demic majors. LMs also have been found to endorse more humanistic items 
on the Tomkins Polarity Scale (Ehrlichman & Weinberger, 1978). R. E. Gur 
(1973) did not find differences between LMs and RMs on the Strong Voca­
tional Interest Blank and, contrary to expectation, found that RMs rather 
than LMs performed better on the Minnesota Spatial Relations Test.
Ehrlichman and Weinberger (1978) in a review of the LM/RM 
research, report that despite general consistency in findings in this 
area, studies that have used standard personality measures such as the 
MMPI, 16PF Questionnaire, Rorschach and field dependence-independence 
measures have failed to find consistent differences between the two 
groups. Ehrlichman and Weinberger further report that several studies 
have failed to differentiate LMs and RMs using a variety of verbal, spa­
tial and imagery ability tests. They also note that there have been 
equivocal findings in research comparing the two groups on creativity. 
Because of studies that have failed to differentiate LMs and RMs on 
tasks that would appear most likely to characterize the abilities of the 
left and right hemispheres (e.g., verbal and imagery) Ehrlichman and 
Weinberger have been critical of the interpretation that LMs rely more 
on right hemisphere mental processes and RMs on left hemisphere func­
tioning. They allow that there are some quite consistent differences 
between LMs and RMs but deny the relevance of the differences to left 
versus right hemisphere processing. They give hypnotic susceptibility as 
an example of a consistent but non-relevant difference. It could be 
argued, however, that features of right hemispheric cognitions, e.g., 
holistic, non-analytic, global, non-logical, are features of the mental 
attitude and processing important to attaining a hypnotic state.
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The Relationship of Differential Hemispheric Functioning to 
Repression. As indicated earlier in this paper, Galin (1977) distills 
the findings of Sperry and his colleagues into two fundamental observa­
tions: (a) lateral specialization of cognitive function and (b) the
capability of the two cerebral hemispheres, when surgically separated, 
to sustain independent, autonomous consciousness. The latter provides 
for a duality or dissociation of consciousness. Up to this point, this 
paper has addressed research in lateral specialization. The focus now 
changes to the duality and dissociation of consciousness and to their 
relationship to repression. It should be pointed out that much of the 
research in lateral specialization that has been reviewed also is rele­
vant to a study of hemispheric duality.
In general, neuropsychological research has focused on lateral­
ization of function, leaving the study of dissociations and internal 
conflicts to clinical psychology and psychiatry. Galin (1974, 1977) 
has attempted a rapproachement between the research evidence in neuro­
psychology and psychodynamic theory, by pointing out parallels between 
the behavior of split-brain patients and individuals employing the 
defense mechanism of repression. Here again Galin refers to the work of 
Sperry and his colleagues. In describing the dissociated visual experi­
ences of commissurotomy patients, Sperry (1968) notes that visual mate­
rial projected to the right half of the field (left hemisphere) can be 
described in speech and writing in an essentially normal manner. But 
when the visual material is projected to the left half of the field 
(right hemisphere) the patient insists he saw either nothing or a flash 
of light. If, instead of asking the patient to verbally report what he
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saw, he is instructed to use his left hand to point out a matching pic­
ture or object from a group of pictures or objects, he has no trouble in 
pointing out the very item he had just insisted he did not see. Sperry 
also found that the right hemisphere of commissurotomy patients can com­
prehend both written and spoken words to some extent, although this com­
prehension cannot be expressed verbally. For example, if the name of an 
object, e.g., the word "eraser", is flashed to the left visual field, 
the patient can select correctly an eraser from a group of objects, 
using only touch with the left hand. The conclusion is that the right 
hemisphere must have read and understood the test word. Of course, if 
asked to name the object, the patient is unable, since the "talking" 
left hemisphere has no access to the information in the right hemisphere. 
The behavior of these patients is analogous to that explained by the 
psychodynamic notion that unconscious processes have a direct influence 
on behavior while remaining outside of awareness. Levy, Trevarthen, and 
Sperry (1972) demonstrate that there can exist concurrent diverse per­
ceptual events in each of the disconnected hemispheres. In their experi­
ments different stimuli, such as photographs of faces, were exposed 
briefly and simultaneously to the right and left visual half-fields. If 
the subject vras asked to select from an array of photos, by pointing to 
the one he had just seen, he would tend to select the photo that had 
been exposed to the left half-fields (right hemisphere). If asked to 
describe the face he had seen, he x^ ould describe the face exposed to the 
right visual half-field (left hemisphere). Sperry (1968) provides a 
startling example of behavior in split-brain patients which mimics 
repression. In this experiment a series of neutral geometric figures
\are flashed tachistoscopically to the right and left visual half-fields 
at random. A pinup shot of a nude is interjected, by surprise, to the 
left field. When asked to report what he saw, the patient will invari­
ably state either nothing or just a flash of light. Despite the verbal 
report, the patient will respond emotionally with a grin, a giggle or a 
blush. When asked why he is giggling, the patient is unable to say.
What is noteworthy here is the ability of a single hemisphere to trigger 
emotional reactions appropriate to the information entering it, yet of 
which the other hemisphere is totally unaware (Lishman, 1971). If the 
physical fact of the commissurotomy were not known to the observer, one 
might conclude the patient was repressing the perception of conflictual 
material.
In commenting on the results of the split brain research, Sperry 
(1966) notes that such patients are left with two separate minds, or two 
separate spheres of consciousness. The mental activities of one hemi­
sphere lie entirely outside the realm of awareness of the other hemi­
sphere. Bogen (1969b) suggests that duality is also present in the 
intact, normal brain so that commissurotomy only serves to make the 
already present duality evident.
The psychodynamic approach to duality began with Freud's early 
topographic model of the mind (Galin, 1977). In this early formulation, 
repressed mental contents functioned in a separate realm that was inac­
cessible to conscious recall or verbal interrogation. This realm func­
tioned according to its own rules and pursued its own goals. Based on 
commissurotomy research, the analogous structures for the "unconscious"
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would be the right cerebral hemisphere with its contents inaccessible to 
conscious (i.e., verbal) recall.
Later psychodynamic models based the division of the mind on 
differences in the formal organization of thought and the control of 
emotional energy, with the focus on primary versus secondary thought 
processes (Galin, 1977). Horowitz (1972) provides a model for the 
defenses based on the interactions between different modes of thought 
representation. There are two different forms of thought (image and 
lexical or verbal) and two different ways in which thought is organized 
(primary process and secondary process). The two different forms of 
thought conform to the cerebral lateralization of cognitive mode (right 
hemisphere for images, left hemisphere for verbal). Horowitz notes that 
images are suited to express the immediate quality and intensity of com­
plicated affective states which are hard to articulate and that censor­
ship operates less well over images than over lexical thought. Freud 
and others actually used images to skirt defensive procedures and gain 
access to repressed mental contents by asking patients to think in 
images rather than in words. If the right hemisphere is the locus of 
repressed mental contents it would follow that entry to this material 
could best be gained through right hemisphere cognitive forms.
The two types of thought organization (primary and secondary 
process) distinguish the organization of thought in the two hemispheres 
(primary for the right hemisphere, secondary for the left hemisphere). 
The characteristics of secondary process— analytical, propositional, 
sequential— are attributed to left hemisphere cognition (Bogen, 1969b). 
Certain aspects of right hemisphere functioning are congruent with
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primary process thinking (Galin, 1977): (a) The right hemisphere pri­
marily uses a nonverbal mode of representation, including visual, tac­
tile, auditory and kinesthetic images (Morgan, McDonald, & McDonald, 
1971; Moscovitch, 1976). (b) The right hemisphere reasons by nonlinear
mode of association rather than syllogistic logic. It is superior to 
the left hemisphere in part/whole relations, grasping the concept of the 
whole or gestalt from a part (Nebes, 1974; Zangwill, 1974). (c) The
right hemisphere is less involved with the perception of time and 
sequence than is the left (Zangwill, 1974). (d) While the right hemi­
sphere possesses words, these are not used in propositional speech.
Right hemisphere speech reflects complexes taken as a whole rather than 
serially considered parts. Examples would be puns, double-entendres, 
metaphors, rebus (\-7ord pictures), the sort of language that appears in 
dreams and slips of the tongue (Bogen, 1969b). The right hemisphere has 
the advantage for emotional tone (Schwartz et al., 1975) and contextual 
inference (Dwyer, 1976) while the left hemisphere has the advantage for 
the content of messages. (e) The right hemisphere produces more archaic 
(unconscious, affective, intuitive) associations to words than does the 
left hemisphere (Adair, 1976).
Galin (1977) proposes that in normal, intact individuals the 
neural events of the right hemisphere can become disconnected function­
ally from the left hemisphere and can continue a life of their own. To 
the extent that unconscious processes are subserved by the right hemi­
sphere, it can be expected that expression of unconscious material will 
be through output channels not preempted by the left hemisphere. While 
the left hemisphere has preemptive control over the mainstream of body
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activity and propositional speech, two vehicles for expression left open 
to the right hemisphere are dreams and somatosensory representations.
The mode of cognition in dreaming is primary process, that is, it is 
nonverbal, uses image representations and nonsyllogistic logic, and vio­
lates normal temporal sequencing. Galin (1974) reviews reports regard­
ing the dreams of brain-injured patients. Some patients with posterior 
brain injuries that resulted in left homonymous hemianopsia (indicating 
injury to the right visual pathways) have spontaneously reported cessa­
tion of dreaming. These patients also have impaired visual imagery in 
the waking state. Several split-brain patients also reported they no 
longer had dreams. One interpretation of the latter finding is that the 
right hemisphere may still have been experiencing dreams, but the 
reporting left hemisphere no longer had access to the right hemisphere’s 
experiences. To illustrate how unconscious right hemisphere processes 
may be expressed somatically, Galin (1977) notes a greater incidence of 
conversion symptoms on the left side of the body. Ferenczi (1926) was 
first to observe that unilateral hysterical conversion symptoms (in this 
case hemianesthesia) are more common on the left side. Engel (1970) 
also observed conversion hemisensory disturbance to be more frequent on 
the left side. To substantiate the observations of Ferenczi and Engel, 
Galin, Diamond and Braff (1977) undertook an examination of the hospital 
records of patients with lateralized conversion symptoms at the Univer­
sity of California, San Francisco Hospitals from 1963 through 1974. Of 
the 52 patients meeting criteria for inclusion in the study, a signifi­
cantly greater percentage (63%) had unilateral symptoms on the left.
When only females were included in the analysis, 71% showed left-sided
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symptoms. Kenyon (1964) studied a hospital patient population with 
hypochondriacal symptoms. Of those patients with hypochondriasis as the 
primary diagnosis and who had unilateral symptoms, 65% were referred to 
the left side of the body. Where hypochondriasis was a secondary diag­
nosis, 80.7% of patients with unilateral complaints had them on the left 
side.
In an early study Halliday (1937) looked at unilateral symptoms 
in psychosomatic disorders. He found that 13 of 14 rheumatoid patients 
with neck and arm pain experienced these symptoms on the left. R. E.
Gur (1973) found that individuals who make more left lateral eye move­
ments (presumably activating the right hemisphere) are more likely to 
report psychosomatic symptoms than are right movers. The relationship 
between repressed mental contents of the right hemisphere and psycho­
somatic symptoms is complicated by findings reported by Reyher and his 
associates (Perkins & Reyher, 1971; Reyher & Basch, 1970; Sommerschild & 
Reyher, 1973) who report a negative correlation between frequency of 
physical symptoms and the degree of repression.
Paradoxes in the literature on the relationship between psycho­
somatic symptoms and repression may stem from two sources. The 
Repression-Sensitization Scale (Byrne, 1963), which is used widely to 
operationalize the concept of repression, correlates highly with stan­
dard measures of anxiety (Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). As a 
result a low score on this measure of repression may either be a func­
tion of excessive denial and repression of conflict or may be due to 
lack of anxiety without significant defensiveness (Orlofsky, 1976).
Since an additional measure of defensiveness, such as the Social
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Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was not used in the investi­
gations of the relationship between psychosomatic symptoms and repres­
sion, these studies may have contaminated their repressor group with low 
anxious, non-repressing individuals. In addition, Weinberger et al. 
(1979) point out that repressors are not cognizant of their own physio­
logical symptoms of anxiety. Similarly they may ignore or repress the 
recognition of the symptoms of physical illness. Thus, self-report mea­
sures of physical illness may not reflect a repressor's actual physical 
status. The use of self-report without independent verification of ill­
ness in some of the studies cited would be another source of error.
Research in hemispheric differences in affective reactions and 
coping strategies suggests a more direct relationship between right 
hemisphere functioning and repression. As indicated earlier in this 
paper, anosognosia (the condition in which a patient with gross neuro­
logical deficit, such as hemiphegia or hemianopsia, is unaware of his 
disability, shows an attitude of indifference or denies it) is much more 
common following right hemisphere lesions (Gainotti, 1969, 1972, 1976; 
Heilman, Scholes, & Watson, 1975). This denial of dysfunction is analo­
gous to the denial of unpleasant thoughts seen in the hysteric.
Bear and Fedio (1977), in a study of temporal lobe epileptics, 
found that right temporal lobe epileptics rated themselves more highly 
on socially desirable traits than observers rated them. The euphoria 
experienced with right carotid amytal injection (Gainotti, 1972) implies 
a denial of the significance of the patient's circumstances (impending 
neurosurgery). Both findings can be interpreted as a denial or minimi­
zation of the negative and parallel the defensive strategy of the
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hysterical patient. If the emotional responses of individuals with 
right hemisphere dysfunction can be taken to reflect an exaggeration of 
the normal emotional functioning specific to the right hemisphere (an 
extrapolation from the 1968 study of Hall et al.), the extreme denial 
observed in patients with right hemisphere dysfunction may suggest that 
denial and repression as defensive strategies may be mediated by the 
right cerebral hemisphere. Support for this interpretation comes from 
an investigation of normal subjects by Gerdes and Kinsbourne (1974). In 
this study left movers (individuals showing greater activation of the 
right hemisphere) were found to underestimate their level of anxiety.
Other investigators have looked directly at the relationship of 
hemispheric lateralization to defense preference. R. E. Gur and R. C. 
Gur (1975) found that left movers scored higher on a defense mechanism 
cluster that included repression and denial, whereas right movers scored 
higher on the defense cluster of projection and turning against others. 
Woods (1977) compared left and right lookers on the Repression- 
Sensitization Scale and found they did not differ significantly. How­
ever, there was a non-significant tendency for female left lookers to 
score in the repressive direction on the scale. There was a non­
significant tendency for left looking males to score in the sensitizing 
direction, which was the opposite of expectation. Sterne (1977) pre­
dicted that individuals with a greater degree of lateralization (left 
hemisphere performance superiority on a visual discrimination task) 
would use more discreet defenses, that is, defenses that would require a 
more detailed perceptual style such as projection and isolation. Per­
sons with a lesser degree of lateralization (those not showing a left
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hemisphere performance superiority) were expected to use defenses which 
require perception that is capable of assimilating parts into a gestalt 
such as denial or repression. These hypotheses regarding the relation­
ship between lateralization and defense mechanism utilization were not 
supported. Another study that does provide support for the relationship 
between right hemisphere function and repression is Smokier and Shev- 
rin's (1979) evaluation of eye movement prediliction for different per­
sonality styles. They found there was significantly more left-looking 
among hysterical subjects, who use repression and denial as primary 
defenses.
Neuropsychological research suggests the possibility of mental 
duality and the possibility that the right hemisphere is the locus for 
repressed mental contents. Galin (1977) offers a theory as to how this 
duality may develop and a possible mechanism for repression. Develop­
mental neuroanatomy provides a clue as to how duality might develop.
The cerebral commissures are not myelinated at birth. Myelinization 
does not begin until age four months and is not completed for at least 
four years. If the function of the commissures is reduced in at least 
the first two years of life this would provide the condition for the two 
cerebral hemispheres to organize themselves as separate, autonomous 
(dual) entities. As the commissures mature, communication between the 
hemispheres becomes possible. However, the hemispheres may still retain 
their ability to function autonomously.
According to Galin (1977), there are two different ways in which 
the hemispheres could function as though disconnected in normals, i.e., 
two possible mechanisms for repression. Because the two hemispheres
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have specialized areas of competence, different forms for thought repre­
sentation and different ways in which thought is organized, the knowl­
edge that one hemisphere possesses may not translate well into the lan­
guage of the other. Galin provides two illustrative examples: (a) 
aspects of the experience of attending a symphony concert are not 
readily expressed in words and (b) the concept that "democracy requires 
informed participation" is hard to convey in images. What may be trans­
lated is only the conclusion and not the details on which the evaluation 
was based. Bogen (1969a) provides an example of how this difficulty in 
translation can be seen in a patient population. Following cerebral 
commissurotomy, the right hander has a period of apraxia in the left 
hand and is unable to follow a verbal instruction with the left hand, 
such as, "stick out your left little finger". Bogen suggests that this 
apraxia may be based on the inability of the right hemisphere to trans­
late verbal comprehension into action. Gazzaniga (1972) suggests that 
early childhood experiences may be inaccessible because they occur 
before the development of a language system and, therefore, are incapa­
ble of translation into or retrieval by that system. Galin (1977) 
hypothesizes another mechanism for disconnection— the active inhibition 
of neuronal transmission across the corpus callosum and other cerebral 
commissures. J. E. Bogen and G. M. Bogen (1969) also hypothesize 
inhibitory activity in the callosal fibers that may prevent access to 
the left hemisphere of the products of right hemisphere activity. 
Research on the neuroanatomy and neuropsychological functioning of 
schizophrenics is relevant here. Rosenthal and Bigelow (1972) report 
that the corpus callosum of schizophrenics has been found to be
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abnormally thick on autopsy. This finding, in isolation, would not sup­
port the notion of difficulty in transmission across the corpus col- 
losum. However, Beaumont and Dimond (1973) have found that schizo­
phrenics have particular difficulty in inter- as opposed to intra­
hemisphere cognitive transfer when compared to normals. Other investi­
gators (Dimond, Scammel, Pryce, Huws, & Gray, 1979) have found that 
schizophrenics exhibit left hand anomia (i.e., difficulty in correctly 
naming objects placed in the left hand out of vision). This would sup­
port the idea that, at least in some individuals, the left hemisphere 
has difficulty gaining access to right hemisphere data.
Based on the problems in translation between hemispheres and on 
certain other features of right hemisphere and left hemisphere process­
ing, a neuropsychological model for at least some instances of repres­
sion can be proposed that does not require the condition of active 
inhibition at the commissures. According to the model proposed in this 
paper, the right hemisphere has a lower threshold for the perception of 
visual stimuli, contextual cues, inferences, emotional tone, etc. If 
these aspects of a stimulus (when perceived subliminally by the right 
hemisphere) arouse internal conflict, anxiety ensues. This anxiety 
renders the left hemisphere dysfunctional so that perception and pro­
cessing proceed along right hemisphere lines. The material is organ­
ized through right hemisphere modes and stored in right hemisphere forms 
which are not readily translatable into left hemisphere terms. As a 
result, the material remains "repressed" unless accessed through right 
hemisphere modes and forms (dreams, free associations, etc.). Another 
implication is that since the material is not available to the scrutiny
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of left hemisphere logic and analysis, reality testing would be impaired. 
This provides an explanation for how irrational beliefs develop and why 
they are so resistant to change by rational analysis.
Before proceeding with a testable hypothesis based on this 
model, additional research evidence may be reviewed which is relevant to 
this formulation. Goodglass, in a personal communication to Dimond and 
Beaumont (1974), reported a lower threshold for visual stimuli presented 
to the right hemisphere. One would also expect a lower threshold by 
the right hemisphere for verbal tone, inferences, contextual cues, innu­
endo, etc. A number of researchers have provided evidence that sublim­
inal perception is more likely to occur with individuals who show a 
greater reliance on right hemisphere over left hemisphere functioning 
or those who adopt a right hemisphere cognitive style. Murch (1969) 
found that subjects who used intuitive cognitive strategies showed 
greater subliminal effects than subjects who used an analytic, premedi­
tated approach. Allison (1963) found subliminal effects when subjects 
were instructed to think "globally, intuitively and freely" but not when 
subjects were instructed to think in analytic, logical and organized 
modes. Gordon (1967) found significant subliminal effects for students 
in the arts and humanities (who may be more likely to have a right hemi­
sphere cognitive style) but not for science and engineering students. 
Sackeim, Packer and Gur (1977) found an interactive effect between hemi­
sphericity and cognitive set on subliminal perception. Left movers 
(right hemisphericity subjects) showed subliminal effects when encour­
aged to report their perceptions in a holistic fashion. An unpredicted 
finding was that right movers (left hemisphericity subjects) also showed
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subliminal effects if encouraged to report their impressions in an 
organized and logical manner. The latter finding conflicts with previ­
ous research in subliminal perception which points to generally greater 
subliminal effects when a right hemisphere approach is utilized.
If the right hemisphere more readily perceives subliminal 
effects, this would mean that stimuli could be perceived by the right 
hemisphere before conscious awareness (by the left hemisphere). If the 
material perceived subliminally by the right hemisphere is conflictual, 
anxiety would then be aroused before left hemisphere perception could 
occur. Some research studies have addressed the effects of anxiety on 
hemisphere function. Budzynski (1977) has hypothesized that the left 
hemisphere functions effectively over a narrow mid-range of cortical 
arousal. He gives the example that when frightened, one "doesn't think 
straight". He suggests that at arousal levels above and below this nar­
row mid-range, the right hemisphere takes over. Studies by Tucker and 
colleagues (Tucker at al., 1978) support this hypothesis. In an initial 
experiment, Tucker and his associates found that higher state anxiety 
was associated with greater errors in the right visual half-field (left 
hemisphere); left visual half-field errors (right hemisphere function­
ing) were not affected by anxiety. In a second experiment, Tucker at al 
found that higher trait anxiety was associated xrith greater right ear 
(left hemisphere) attentional bias. Taken together these studies indi­
cate that when significant anxiety is present, the left hemisphere 
becomes overactive but dysfunctional, whereas right hemisphere function 
is relatively unimpaired. This would set the stage for repression as 
outlined in the model. Once conflicts were stimulated and anxiety
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aroused, left hemisphere processing would be impaired and perception 
and processing could proceed along right hemisphere lines. Cognition 
would be organized in terms of primary process and would assume right 
hemisphere forms (e.g., images).
The difficulty in translating from right hemisphere to left 
hemisphere forms provides the final, necessary condition for "repres­
sion" of mental contents in the unconscious (the right hemisphere). 
Lishman (1971) in discussing the emotional responses of commissurotomy 
patients notes that the right hemisphere, working in isolation, can 
trigger emotional responses to information that is presented only to 
that hemisphere and of which the left hemisphere is unaware. The exis­
tence of a separate, autonomous emotional "life" in the right hemisphere 
may also occur in normal individuals where the connections between hemi­
spheres are intact but where translation from the language of one hemi­
sphere to that of the other is difficult. Two dichotic listening 
studies are relevant here (Gordon, 1973; Milner, Taylor, & Sperry,
1968). In both studies different commands were presented to the left 
and right ears. The left hand carried out the command presented to the 
left ear (right hemisphere). However, when subjects were questioned 
immediately after a trial, they were often unable to name or misnamed 
the actions carried out by the left hand. It would appear that the left 
hemisphere was occupied with its own task and, as a result, did not 
attend to the task being carried out by the right hemisphere. Since it 
was the right hemisphere that was involved in decoding the message pre­
sented to the left ear and in formulating the action for the left hand, 
it can be surmised that the entire process took place in right
41
hemisphere modes and forms, not readily available to left hemisphere 
translation. The finding by Dimond et al. (1979) of left hand anomia 
in schizophrenics also suggests that information processed and encoded 
by the right hemisphere is difficult for the left hemisphere to access.
A study by Risse and Gazzaniga (1976) also supports the notion of dif­
ficulty in translation between hemispheres. Patients were given left 
carotid injections of sodium amytal, effectively anesthetizing the left 
cerebral hemisphere. While the left hemisphere was anesthetized, the 
patient was presented with a familiar object in the left hand out of 
view and allowed to palpate it for several seconds. After the drug 
effects subsided, the patients were unable to name the object but rec­
ognized it immediately when presented visually along with other items. 
These patients readily named objects which had been presented prior to 
amytal injection so this finding does not indicate a general disturbance 
in recall. Instead, the results may suggest that the left hemisphere 
does not have access to right hemisphere memories encoded xrtiile the left 
hemisphere is dysfunctional. If the right hemisphere memories were not 
available to verbal consciousness, they might remain effectively 
repressed in the right hemisphere unless accessed through right hemi­
sphere modes.
Of relevance to this model is the body of research on state 
dependent learning and memory. Several studies which have used drugs 
to manipulate state have found that free-recall is higher under condi­
tions where input state is congruent with test state. In one study 
(Bustamente, Jordan, Vila, Gonzalez, & Insua, 1970) learning and test 
trials were conducted under similar conditions for controls (i.e.,
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subjects participated in both learning and testing trials under a 
drugged, amphetamine or amobarbital, or non-drugged, placebo, state). 
Learning and test trials were conducted under different conditions for 
experimental subjects (e.g., learning trial after amphetamine, test 
trial after placebo ingestion). The same forgetting curve was found 
for both drug controls and for placebo controls. However, there was 
impaired retrieval in the experimental groups. Similar results have 
been found in studies manipulating state through the use of alcohol 
(Eich, Weingartner, Stillman, & Gillin, 1975) and marijuana (Goodwin, 
Powell, Bremer, Hoine, & Stern, 1969) . Bartlett and Santrock (1979) 
suggest that the state dependent memory phenomenon may occur when state 
is varied by affective condition rather than drugs. To test this 
hypothesis, they presented five-year-old children with target words in 
contexts designed to induce happy or sad affect. Memory for the words 
was later tested under happy or sad conditions and, as expected, free 
recall was better under conditions where affective learning and affec­
tive test states were congruent. It is feasible that state dependent 
memory effects may be mediated by differential hemisphere functioning 
occurring under different states. If a drug (or affectively) induced 
state would either facilitate or impair cerebral hemisphere function 
differentially, then processing and encoding of information might pro­
ceed essentially in the language of a single hemisphere. During 
retrieval the same state that resulted in one hemisphere's prepotence 
would have to again be invoked so that the same hemisphere could access 
the information stored in its language.
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The Present Study
According to the neuropsychological model for repression sug­
gested in this paper, the right hemisphere has an advantage for the per­
ception of certain stimuli (visual images, contextual cues, inferences, 
emotional tone, etc.)- If the perception of these aspects of a stimu­
lus arouses anxiety, the left hemisphere becomes dysfunctional and per­
ception and encoding of information proceed along right hemisphere 
lines. Retrieval is best accomplished through right hemisphere modes 
because of the difficulty in translating from right to left hemisphere 
terms.
The issues involved in the various aspects of this model are 
extremely complex. One of these is the basic assumption that anxiety 
results in greater left than right hemisphere performance impairment. 
Previous research (Tucker et al., 1978) would suggest that this is the 
case. However, Tucker et al. employed specialized techniques to 
restrict input to a single hemisphere. This has also been the case in 
studies of hemisphere dissociation or duality in commissurotomy 
patients (Sperry, 1968). However, in nature when repression occurs 
information is presented simultaneously to both hemispheres. In the 
present study, then, information input was provided simultaneously to 
both cerebral hemispheres. Under these conditions if anxiety could be 
shown to impair left hemisphere performance significantly more than 
right hemisphere performance, a basis for repression would be suggested.
In order to assess left versus right performance impairment, 
subjects were asked to perform tasks that require relatively greater
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involvement by one or the other hemisphere. They were also asked to 
perform a task that combined components specific to the functioning of 
each cerebral hemisphere.
In order to evaluate the effects of anxiety on differential 
hemispheric functioning, arousal state was manipulated. Ethical consid­
erations mitigated against manipulating state anxiety related to 
repressed sexual or other conflictual material. As an alternative, 
state anxiety was varied by way of arousal induced experimentally 
through task instructions and the use of white noise. Based on the 
model, this manipulation could be reasonably expected to reveal differ­
ences in left versus right hemisphere performance among experimental 
groups. However, individual differences might interact with level of 
arousal to affect task performance. Based on the model, individuals 
who are characteristically anxious could be expected to evidence a cog­
nitive style marked by overactivation but impairment of left hemisphere 
functioning. For this reason a factorial design was employed, using 
both trait and state anxiety as independent variables. Other individ­
ual difference variables might affect the interaction of trait and state 
anxiety on performance. Important variables to consider would be dif­
ferences in sex, direction of eye movements, and tendency to repress. 
Woods (1977), in a comparison of left and right lookers on the 
repression-sensitization scale found tendencies for female and male left 
lookers to differ. Female left lookers scored in the repressive direc­
tion and males in the sensitizing direction on the scale. Because of 
findings such as these it would be important to take sex of subject into 
account in the present study. The findings of Woods as well as other
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investigators (R. E. Gur & R. C. Gur, 1975; Smokier & Shevrin, 1979) 
regarding differences in tendency to repress for left versus right look­
ers would argue for a consideration of individual differences in eye 
movement directionality. Individual differences in characteristic 
defensive style should also be taken into account by way of a measure of 
repressive tendencies. These factors were not controlled in the experi­
mental design. However, measures were taken of these individual differ­
ence variables so that the uncontrolled variance contributed by them to 
the independent variables could be removed by way of covariate analysis.
In the present study, performance on left hemisphere tasks would 
be expected to be more adversely affected by anxiety than would perfor­
mance on right hemisphere tasks. It would be expected that the right 
hemisphere (global) features of the combined task would prove more 
salient under conditions of anxiety than would the left hemisphere 
(analytic) features. The present study was expected to lend further 
understanding to the relationship between differential hemispheric func­
tioning and repression. If the hypotheses were supported, this would 
suggest the basic ingredient for neuropsychologically based repression—  
a suspension of the logic and analysis of the verbal left hemisphere so 
that cognition might proceed in right hemisphere primary process terms.
CHAPTER II
Subjects
METHOD
subjects were university undergraduates recruited from introduc­
tory psychology classes and given course research credits for their par­
ticipation. Subjects were screened using a trait anxiety questionnaire 
(Spielberger, 1968). Assignment to high and low trait anxiety groups 
was based on criteria used in a study by Tucker et al. (1978) in which 
these groups were distinguished by differential hemispheric activation 
with the high anxious subjects demonstrating an increased left hemi­
sphere activation. The score cut-offs were 49 for the high trait 
anxiety group and 40 for the low group (Tucker, Note 6). Of the 60 
subjects selected for participation, 22 received high scores on the 
trait anxiety measure, 33 obtained low scores and 5 scored in the mid­
range. Twenty-three subjects were male; 37 were female. All subjects 
also participated in a separate experiment involving a visual perception 
task, immediately preceding this study. All experimental subjects were 
right handed and reported normal vision or normal vision with correction. 
Audiometric screening was conducted with each subject to assure func­
tional hearing. Using a Beltone audiometer set at 25 decibels, hearing 
was assessed at frequencies of 250, 500, 1000, 2000, 4000 and 8000 Hz.
All subjects demonstrated auditory acuity adequate for the experimental 
tasks.
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Experimental Tasks
Experimental tasks were chosen to indicate differential hemi­
spheric function. There are certain limits on inferring exclusive use 
of one hemisphere on a task. While this would represent the ideal situ­
ation, in reality there are more likely contributions by both hemi­
spheres to any one endeavor. However, by selecting tasks for which 
research data is strongly supportive of differential hemispheric func­
tioning, one can hope to look at the relative contributions of one hemi­
sphere over the other. A visual and an auditory task dependent on rela­
tively greater left hemisphere functioning were employed as well as a 
visual and an auditory task that rely on relatively greater right cere­
bral hemisphere functioning. The two left hemisphere tasks were the 
verb count and digits forward tasks. Tonal memory and Mooney Closure 
Faces were the right hemisphere tasks that were used. The design dis­
crimination task combined left hemisphere and right hemisphere task 
features.
Evidence regarding the hemisphere specificity of the verb count 
task comes from EEG studies of differential hemispheric activation with 
tasks varying in linguistic difficulty (McKee, Humphrey & McAdam, 1973). 
The greatest left hemisphere activation was demonstrated on a task 
requiring subjects to glean, from a reading, all instances of the usage 
of a particular verb. Left hemisphere specificity for auditory percep­
tion of digits has been demonstrated through use of the dichotic listen­
ing procedure (Kimura, 1967) . Other evidence for the role of the left 
hemisphere in recall of digits is derived from the study of patients who
48
have undergone left temporal lobectomy (Shankweiler, 1966). Evaluation 
of these patients has revealed significant reduction in accuracy of 
reporting digits. Differential hemisphere function in the ability to 
recall tones has also been demonstrated in the study of lobectomy 
patients. Milner (1967) found that following right temporal lobectomy 
there is impairment in the discrimination of tonal patterns, as measured 
by the Seashore Tonal Memory Test. Performance of the Mooney Closure 
Faces Test has been demonstrated, through EEG studies (Tucker, 1974, 
1976), to rely on right hemisphere functioning. Tucker found greater 
alpha desynchrony, i.e., greater activation, of the right hemisphere 
during performance of the Mooney task. The finding was significant for 
individuals classified on personality measures as more differentiated 
and for males. The design discrimination task combines distinct ana­
lytic and global features. Although hemisphere specificity for the dif­
ferent aspects of this task has not been previously evaluated, research 
in differential cognitive and perceptual functioning of the hemispheres 
has demonstrated the left hemisphere adept at tasks requiring analytic 
analysis, whereas the right hemisphere is superior on tasks dependent on 
global processing (Springer, 1977).
The verb count task (left hemisphere task) consisted of a prac­
tice trial and two experimental trials, each utilizing a paragraph of 
reading material projected on a screen (see Appendix A). Task instruc­
tion included a definition and examples of verbs. Subjects were 
instructed to count the verbs contained in each paragraph and to give 
the total when the slide left the screen. Following a practice trial, 
the correct responses for the practice paragraph were pointed out by the
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experimenter. Each paragraph was presented for 35 seconds. The error 
score for each of the two experimental trials was equal to the absolute 
difference between the subjects' answer and the correct number of verbs 
contained in a paragraph. Error scores for the two experimental trials 
were summed to give a single verb count error score for each subject.
The digits forward task (left hemisphere) was modeled after the 
WISC-R digit span subtest. Subjects were presented with digit sequences 
of increasing length, beginning with two digits. The subject was asked 
to repeat each sequence. Two trials were administered for each sequence 
length, and the task continued until the subject missed both trials of a 
given series. A score of two was assigned if the subject correctly 
repeated both trials of a given sequence length; a score of one was 
assigned if only one of the two trials was repeated correctly, a score 
of zero if both trials were missed. Scores were summed to provide a 
single digits forward score for each subject.
The Mooney Closure Faces Test (Mooney, 1956) is a right hemi­
sphere task that uses as task stimuli irregular shapes which at first 
appear meaningless. When synthesized into an integrated gestalt, each 
shape becomes a face. The task of the subject is to signal when his 
perception of the stimulus changes from an amorphous shape to a face.
In the present study subjects were given a maximum of 30 seconds for 
identification. After signaling recognition, subjects were asked to 
trace the outline of the face, pointing out the features as they did so. 
One practice trial and eight experimental trials \<rere administered. A 
score of one was assigned for each correct response; these were summed 
for the eight experimental trials. A latency to response score, in
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seconds, was also obtained for each trial with a latency of 30 seconds 
ascribed to incorrect responses. Latency scores were also summed across 
the eight trials.
The tonal memory task (right hemisphere) was derived from the 
Seashore Tonal Memory Test (Saetveit, Lewis, & Seashore, 1940). It was 
similar to the digits forward task but employed tones rather than num­
bers. The task consisted of tones combined in sequences of increasing 
length. For each trial, two sequences of equal length were presented, 
and subjects were asked to state whether the sequences were the same or 
different. In order to be classified as the same, the two sequences had 
to be identical both in tone content and order. Two trials of txro 
sequences each were administered for each length, beginning with two 
tones and proceeding to six tones. A total of ten trials was given to 
each subject. Total number of correct responses was tabulated for each 
subject, each correct response receiving a score of one.
The design discrimination task (combined right and left hemi­
sphere task) was taken from an experiment by Navon (1975, 1977) which 
sought to test whether global perceptual processing precedes analytic 
processing of visual stimuli. The task was designed so that accurate 
perception of a stimulus required that the subject place equal impor­
tance on both levels. It also required a critical duration of stimulus 
exposure that would be too short for good perception at both levels but 
not so short that all perception would be disrupted. The design dis­
crimination task required subjects to make same/different judgments on 
pairs of simple geometric patterns presented sequentially. (See Figure 
1 for the designs that were used.) A pair of designs could differ 
either on the analytic or global level.
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Figure 1. Designs used as test stimuli for the design discrimination task.
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Each pattern consisted of nine squares grouped in three clusters 
of three squares each. Each cluster of three squares was arranged in 
the form of a triangle x^ ith the centers of the squares falling on the 
vertices of an imaginary isoceles triangle. The triangle could point 
up, down, or to the right or left. The spatial arrangement of the three 
clusters with respect to one another followed the same pattern, i.e., 
the three clusters taken together conformed to the shape of a larger 
triangle. The imaginary squares circumscribing each of the three clus­
ters were arranged in such a \<ray that their centers fell on the vertices 
of an imaginary isoceles triangle, three times larger than the triangles 
formed by the three clusters. Within a given design the arrangement of 
squares within the clusters was identical across the three clusters.
This was called the local or analytic configuration of a design. The 
larger configuration formed by the three clusters comprised the global 
configuration.
In essence, then, each pattern resembled a large triangle with 
each point of the triangle composed of a smaller triangle. Each point 
of the smaller triangles was composed of a small square. When comparing 
two designs, the large triangles might differ in their orientation (up, 
down, right, or left) and the small triangles might also differ in their 
orientation from design to design. Within a single design, however, all 
three small triangles were oriented in the same direction. The differ­
ent combinations of orientation of large triangle and orientation of 
smaller component triangles yielded a total of 16 possible designs.
Eight of these were used in the present study and are depicted in
Figure 1.
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In order to disrupt retinal after-image, a mask stimulus pre­
ceded and followed the target stimulus for approximately 200 msec. The 
mask consisted of a profusion of squares identical to those in the 
designs but arranged randomly over the slide. The target stimulus was 
presented for a predetermined exposure duration. Method for deriving 
the exposure duration is explained below. The probe stimulus remained 
on the screen until the subject gave his response.
Subjects were instructed to report if the two designs presented 
sequentially were the same or different. For the designs to be consid­
ered the same, they had to be completely identical, that is, the large 
triangles had to be oriented in the same direction and the smaller com­
ponent triangles of one design had to be oriented in the same direction 
as the smaller component triangles of the second design. There were 
four blocks of 16 experimental trials each. The two designs presented 
on a trial were the same 50 percent of the time. When they differed, it 
was either on the global dimension (25 percent of the time) or the ana­
lytic dimension (25 percent of the time) but never on both levels. Fig­
ure 2 illustrates sample design comparisons. A score of one was assign­
ed to each correct response given when designs differed on the analytic 
dimension. These were summed to provide an analytic score for each sub­
ject. Similarly, a score of one was assigned to each correct response 
given when designs differed on the global dimension and were tallied to 
produce a global score for each subject.
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Relationship
Target
Stimulus
Probe
Stimulus
□ □
* □  □ □  □
Same □□ □□
□  □  □  □ □  □  □  □
□
□□
□  □ □  □  □  □Globally
Different
□  □ □
□  □  □  □ □  □
□ □  □
□  □ □Analytically
Different
□  □ □  □  □  □
□  □  □  □
□□
Figure 2. Sample design comparisons.
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Apparatus
Throughout the experimental tasks, the subjects were seated 
facing a screen, 45 cm. from the face and with central fixation point on 
the screen approximately at eye level. Visual tasks were back projected 
on the screen using a carousel slide projector. Tachistoscopic lenses 
were employed in conjunction with slide projectors for the mask and tar­
get stimuli of the design discrimination task. A portable Centrex cas­
sette tape recorder was centered behind the subject for use with the two 
auditory tasks. A Panasonic cassette recorder, also centered behind the 
subject, was used for a white noise tape. A white noise generator pro­
duced the noise tape. Intensity was monitored using a B and K sound 
level meter, Type 1613. Intensity level of the white noise tape aver­
aged 75 dBSPL. Intensity of the auditory task stimuli tapes (digits and 
tones) averaged 85 dBSPL. The ten decibel difference between white 
noise level and auditory task stimuli was maintained to assure that the 
white noise did not hamper auditory perception of the task stimuli.
Design and Procedure
The experimental design was a 2 x 2 factorial with arousal con­
dition and trait anxiety as the two independent variables and perfor­
mance on the various experimental tasks as the dependent variable. To 
determine if anxiety and arousal were more disruptive to performance of 
the left hemisphere tasks taken as a whole than to performance of the 
right hemisphere tasks, a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures design was 
employed with the within subjects comparison as the third factor. For
56
this analysis, scores on the two left hemisphere tasks were combined, as 
were scores on the two right hemisphere tasks. The repeated measures 
design was also used in evaluating differential performance on the ana­
lytic versus global aspects of the design discrimination task. An 
arousal manipulation (see below) was performed to assess group differ­
ences in hemispheric functioning under high and low arousal conditions. 
Trait anxiety, tendency to repress and eye movement directionality were 
measured to investigate the influence of individual difference variables 
on differential hemispheric function under varying states of arousal.
Experimental subjects were run individually. Following a brief 
explanation regarding the nature of the study, preliminary testing was 
accomplished. This included the audiometric screen, eye movement evalu­
ation, Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Byrne Repression- 
Sensitization Scale, and the stimulus exposure duration determination 
for the design discrimination task.
Eye movement directionality was determined using questions from 
Schwartz, Davidson, and Maer (1975). Experimenter and subject sat 
facing one another while questions were read to the subject. Deviation 
to the left, right, up or down from central fixation was recorded for 
the first shift in gaze following a question. Non-deviations, i.e., 
stares, were also recorded.
The Controlled Repression-Sensitization Scale (Handal, 1973) is 
a 30 item version of the Revised Repression-Sensitization Scale (Byrne, 
1963) that controls, to some degree, for social desirability and acqui­
escence bias. The repression end of the scale (low scores) probably 
identifies not only true repressors but also healthy, non-repressing
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individuals who do not experience much anxiety. Orlofsky (1976) has 
suggested that these txro types of low scorers may be distinguished on 
the basis of their social desirability scores. True repressors would be 
expected to score high and non-defensive, non-anxious subjects to score 
low in social desirability. Orlofsky suggests an additional correction 
to the Repression-Sensitization Scale to weed out the non-defensive non- 
anxious from low scorers. This correction was used in the present study 
and consists of subtracting from the repression score the social desir­
ability score when the repression-sensitization score is below the mean. 
The social desirability score is added to the repression-sensitization 
score when the latter is above the mean.
Critical stimulus exposure duration for the design discrimina­
tion task was determined individually for each subject during the pre­
testing. The procedure was identical to the experimental task except 
that each block of 16 pretesting trials was presented using a different 
exposure time. The critical exposure duration used for the experimental 
trials was that exposure duration at which the subject correctly 
responded 70 to 80 percent of the time during pretesting. This critical 
exposure duration ranged from 40 to 240 msec. Directions for the design 
discrimination task given at the time of the exposure duration determi­
nation included explicit instructions regarding the nature of the task 
and the experimental stimuli. Illustrations depicting sample pair com­
parisons were included. Subjects were questioned regarding these exam­
ples and additional explanations were provided as needed to assure com­
plete understanding of the task. The subjects were instructed to focus 
on the fixation point at center screen at all times except when a blank
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slide was projected. The blanks provided the opportunity for brief 
breaks in which the subject could gaze away from the screen, thereby 
minimizing fatigue. Later, for the experimental task proper, the essen­
tial features of the task instructions were repeated.
Following preliminary testing, the arousal manipulation was 
introduced. Instructions to subjects under the two arousal conditions 
were as follows:
Low Arousal Condition. Now we will do some additional visual 
and auditory perception tasks. The main goal is for you to enjoy
the tasks, so relax and take it easy. I do want you to pay atten­
tion and do the tasks, but don't be so concerned about how you do.
High Arousal Condition. Now we will do some additional visual
and auditory perception tasks. You have been chosen to be in the 
high stress condition. You will be anxious throughout these tasks, 
and you will be quite uptight. However, you should work hard to do 
your very best because this is extremely important.
Following these instructions, subjects in the high arousal con­
dition were given the option of foregoing participation in the remainder 
of the experiment. For high arousal subjects a white noise tape was 
played at 75 decibels throughout the five experimental tasks and during 
completion of state anxiety questionnaires. The tape was not played 
during task instructions. The white noise tape was omitted in the low 
arousal condition. Support for the relationship between white noise and 
increased arousal is derived from the following research findings 
(Berlyne, Borsa, Hamacher & Koenig, 1966): (a) continuous white noise
causes skin resistance to drop significantly over a period of 15-20 min­
utes in conditions that would otherwise leave skin resistance unchanged; 
(b) auditory sounds increase muscle tension; (c) there is neurophysio­
logical evidence that all exteroceptive stimulation (which would include 
white noise) activates the reticular arousal system.
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Following the arousal manipulation, subjects completed the five 
experimental tasks, presented in the same order for all subjects: verb 
count, Mooney Closure Faces, digits forward, tonal memory and design 
discrimination task. State anxiety questionnaires (Spielberger, 1968) 
were completed following the Mooney Closure Faces and the design dis­
crimination task to evaluate the success of the arousal manipulation. 
Feedback was given regarding the purpose of the experiment, and subjects 
were afforded the opportunity to ask questions.
RESULTS
Effectiveness of Experimental Manipulation
The arousal manipulation was successful. Arousal condition sig­
nificantly affected scores on the first state anxiety measure taken,
_F(1, 58) = 12.17, j) = 0.0009; the second state anxiety measure, E^ (l, 58)
= 5.27, £  = 0.03; and the mean of the two state anxiety measures,
_F(1, 58) = 10.12, jd = 0.002. Mean state anxiety scores under conditions 
of low and high arousal were as follows: first state anxiety measure 
38.24 (n = 29), 47.10 (n = 31), respectively; second state anxiety mea­
sure 40.28 (n = 29), 46.55 (n = 31); mean of two measures 39.26 (n = 29), 
46.82 (ji = 31). In each case increased state anxiety occurred under the 
high arousal condition.
Survey of Mean Performance Scores
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for the 
•dependent measures under conditions of high and low trait anxiety and 
high and low state anxiety. For state anxiety, the anxiety measure clos­
est temporally to the arousal manipulation was used. A perusal of the 
means for each dependent measure under conditions of low trait anxiety/ 
low state anxiety versus high trait anxiety/high state anxiety demon­
strates that for three of the four hemisphere-specific tasks (digits 
forward, Mooney Closure Faces, and tonal memory) there was a decline in
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Table 1
Means for Dependent Variables at Different Levels of Trait and State
Anxiety (First Measure)
State Anxiety
Low High Total
Dependent
Measure
Trait
Anxiety n M SD n M SD n M SD
Verb Count- Low 22 6.95 2.50 12 6.67 2.87 34 6.85 2.60
Errors High 12 7.42 3.60 14 6.36 3.48 26 6.85 3.51
Total 34 7.12 2.89 26 6.50 3.15 60 6.85 3.00
Low 22 10.68 1.52 12 10.17 1.64 34 10.50 1.56
Digits Forward High 12 10.33 1.72 14 10.07 1.73 26 10.19 1.70
Total 34 10.56 1.58 26 10.12 1.66 60 10.37 1.62
Mooney Faces- Low 22 4.14 1.49 12 4.42 0.67 34 4.24 1.26
Correct High 12 4.08 1.16 14 3.29 1.82 26 3.65 1.57
Total 34 4.12 1.37 26 3.81 1.50 60 3.98 1.42
Mooney Faces- Low 22 129.82 36.82 12 115.42 17.66 34 124.74 31.87
Latency High 12 131.75 30.70 14 153.21 47.02 26 143.31 41.03
Total 34 130.50 34.32 26 135.77 40.70 60 132.78 36.98
Low 22 7.91 1.44 12 8.17 1.03 34 8.00 1.30
Tonal Memory High 12 8.00 1.13 14 7.14 1.61 26 7.54 1.45
Total 34 7.94 1.32 26 7.62 1.44 60 7.80 1.38
Left Hemisphere Low 22 0.08 0.59 12 - 0.03 0.58 34 0.04 0.58
Tasks Averaged High 12 - 0.10 0.76 14 - 0.01 0.72 26 - 0.05 0.73
For Each Subject Total 34 0.01 0.65 26 - 0.02 0.65 60 0.00 0.64
Table 1— Continued
State Anxiety
Low High Total
Dependent T r a i t --------- ----- - ------------------------------------
Measure Anxiety n M SD n M SD n M SD
Right Hemisphere Low 22 0.09 0.81 12 0.35 0.35 34 0.18 0.69
Tasks Averaged High 12 0.08 0.74 14 - 0.51 0.86 26 - 0.24 0.85
For Each Subject Total 34 0.09 0.77 26 - 0.11 0.79 60 0.00 0.78
Design Discrim- Low 22 10.55 2.60 12 11.67 2.71 34 10.94 2.65
ination Task- High 12 11.83 4.45 14 11.57 2.56 26 11.69 3.48
Analytic Aspect Total 34 11.00 3.36 26 11.62 2.58 60 11.27 3.04
Design Discrim- Low 22 12.32 2.01 12 12.83 2.33 34 12.50 2.11
ination Task- High 12 12.33 2.46 14 11.93 3.38 26 12.12 2.94
Global Aspect Total 34 12.32 2.14 26 12.35 2.92 60 12.33 2.49
o\
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performance with increased anxiety. On the fourth hemisphere specific 
task, verb count, performance improved with increased anxiety (i.e., 
error scores were reduced).
The sixth dependent measure presented in Table 1 is the average 
score on left hemisphere tasks (verb count and digits forward) for each 
subject. To arrive at the measure of left hemisphere performance, for 
each subject scores for the individual tasks were converted to Z scores. 
A negative transformation was then performed on the verb count error 
scores in order that the direction of scores would be the same for this 
task as for digits forward. This transformed verb count score and 
the digits forward Z^ score were then averaged to provide a single com­
bined score for each subject. Right hemisphere task scores (Mooney 
Closure Faces score for number correct, Mooney Closure Faces latency 
score, and tonal memory score) were also averaged in similar fashion to 
provide a single right hemisphere task score for each subject. After 
the three scores were converted to Z^ scores, a negative transformation 
was performed on the latency score; then the three scores were averaged 
to create a single composite score for each subject. All analyses that 
refer to averaged left hemisphere and/or averaged right hemisphere tasks 
used these score averages.
Inspection of Table 1 indicates that for the averaged left hemi­
sphere tasks score there was also a decline with increased anxiety. The 
same held true for the averaged right hemisphere tasks score.
A study of the means for design discrimination, the task that 
contains both left hemisphere and right hemisphere features, reveals for 
the global aspect of the task a decrease in performance scores with
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increased anxiety and for the analytic aspect an increase in performance 
scores with increased anxiety.
Overview of Statistical Analyses
In general, comparisons of the effects of trait and state anxi­
ety on performance measures showed anxiety to significantly impair per­
formance on right rather than left hemisphere tasks. Anxiety was found 
to significantly enhance performance on the analytic (left hemisphere) 
component of the design discrimination task.
Before looking at specific results, an overview of the sequence 
followed in conducting statistical analyses will be provided. Separate 
analyses of variance were performed for each dependent measure as well 
as for the averaged left hemisphere tasks and for the averaged right 
hemisphere tasks (see Table 2). Trait anxiety and state anxiety were 
the two between subjects factors in these analyses. Next, a repeated 
measures analysis of variance was performed with each subject's average 
score on left hemisphere tasks versus his average score for right hemi­
sphere tasks as the within subjects variable (see Table 3). A repeated 
measure analysis of variance was also performed for the design discrimi­
nation task with analytic versus global aspect of the task as the within 
subjects variable (see Table 4).
All of the analyses described thus far were performed using 
trait anxiety and the first state anxiety measure as the two continuous 
independent variables. It was reasoned that the first state anxiety 
measure (closest temporally to the arousal manipulation) should be most 
reflective of the arousal manipulation. Each subject had three state
Table 2
Summary of Analyses of Variance for Dependent Measures
Dependent Variable Source df MS F £  =
Verb Count-Errors Trait Anxiety (T) 1 5.14 0.55 n. s.
State Anxiety-First Measure (SI) 1 3.02 0.32 n. s.
T X SI 1 5.12 0.55 n. s.
Error 56 9.31
Digits Forward T 1 0.28 0.11 n. s.
SI 1 0.33 0.12 n. s.
T X SI 1 0.03 0.01 n. s.
Error 56 2.63
Mooney Faces-Correct T 1 6.32 3.49 n. s.
SI 1 7.78 4.30 0.04
T X SI 1 9.92 5.48 0.02
Error 56 1.81
Mooney Faces-Correct T 1 10.16 5.27 0.03
Arousal Condition (A) 1 4.03 2.09 n.s.
T X A 1 4.15 2.15 n. s.
Error 56 1.93
Mooney Faces-Latency T 1 6084.94 5.15 0.03
SI 1 8331.33 7.06 0.01
T X SI 1 9424.69 7.98 0.01
Error 56 1180.47
Tonal Memory T 1 6.10 3.32 n.s.
SI 1 4.80 2.61 n.s.
T X SI 1 6.79 3.70 n.s.
Error 56 1.84
Table 2— Continued
Dependent Variable Source df MS F £ =
Left Hemisphere Tasks T 1 0.29 0.69 n. s.
SI 1 0.22 0.51 n. s.
T X SI 1 0.19 0.44 n. s.
Error 56 0.43
Right Hemisphere Tasks T 1 3.58 7.03 0.001
Averaged for Each SI 1 4.03 7.93 0.01
Subj ect T X SI 1 5.04 9.91 0.003
Error 56 0.51
Design Discrimination T 1 35.78 4.05 n. s.
Task-Analytic Aspect SI 1 29.96 3.28 n. s.
T X SI 1 27.02 3.06 n. s.
Error 56 8.83
Design Discrimination T 1 37.43 4.23 0.04
Task-Analytic Aspect State Anxiety-Mean of 2 Measures (MS) 1 24.17 2.73 n.s.
T X MS 1 27.66 3.13 n.s.
Error 56 8.84
Design Discrimination T 1 1.90 0.31 n.s.
Task-Global Aspect SI 1 0.16 0.03 n.s.
T X SI 1 0.24 0.04 n.s.
Error 56 6.19
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Summary of Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance for Averaged 
Left Hemisphere Versus Averaged Right 
Hemisphere Tasks
Table 3
Source df MS F S. =
A. ANOVA Using State Anxiety as Factor
Between Subjects
Trait Anxiety (T) 1 0.91 1.87 n. s.
State Anxiety-First Measure (SI) 1 1.19 2.44 n. s.
T X SI 1 1.64 3.37 n. s.
Error 116 0.49
Within Subjects
Hemisphericity of Averaged Tasks Within
Subject (LR) 1 2.58 5.01 0.03
T X LR 1 2.96 5.76 0.02
SI X LR 1 3.06 5.95 0.02
T X SI X LR 1 3.59 6.98 0.01
Error 56 0.51
B. ANOVA Using Arousal Condition as Factor
Between Subjects
T 1 2.34 4.70 0.03
Arousal Condition (A) 1 0.37 0.75 n.s.
T X A 1 0.26 0.52 n. s.
Error 116 0.50
Within Subjects
LR 1 0.91 1.66 n. s.
T X LR 1 0.92 1.67 n.s.
A X LR 1 1.09 1.98 n.s.
T X A X LR 1 1.42 2.58 n.s.
Error 56 0.55
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Summary of Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance for Analytic 
Versus Global Aspect of the Design Discrimination
Table 4
Source df MS I £ =
A. ANOVA Using State Anxiety as Factor
Between Subjects
Trait Anxiety (T) 1 8.30 1.03 n.s.
State Anxiety-Mean of Two Measures (MS) 1 8.86 1.10 n.s.
T X MS 1 7.66 0.95 n.s.
Error 116 8.04
Within Subjects
Task Component Within Subject (AG) 1 30.41 4.57 0.04
T X AG 1 33.30 5.01 0.03
MS X AG 1 15.80 2.38 n.s.
T X MS X AG 1 21.81 3.28 n.s.
Error 56 6.65
B. ANOVA Using Arousal Condition as Factor
Between Subjects
T 1 0.79 0.10 n.s.
Arousal Condition (A) 1 29.73 3.79 n.s.
T X A 1 24.81 3.17 n.s.
Error 116 7.84
Within Subjects
AG 1 30.33 4.35 0.04
T X AG 1 18.98 2.72 n.s.
A X AG 1 0.70 0.10 n.s.
T X A X AG 1 0.04 0.01 n.s.
Error 56 6.98
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anxiety scores as well as a designation for arousal condition. The 
state anxiety scores were derived from the first measure, taken after 
the Mooney Closure Faces and closest to the arousal manipulation, the 
second measure, taken immediately following the final performance task, 
and the mean of the two measures. Each of the anxiety scores and the 
arousal condition could feasibly be relevant to changes in task perfor­
mance. Therefore, although the primary analysis used the first state 
anxiety measure as a factor, analyses using the second measure, mean of 
two measures or arousal condition were also taken into account if they 
added to an understanding of the relationship to task performance. If 
the combination of one of these factors and trait anxiety resulted in 
significant effects not demonstrated with trait anxiety and the first 
state anxiety measure, these additional findings are also presented.
For example, for the design discrimination task, an analysis employing 
trait anxiety and the average of the two state anxiety measures is also 
presented since it provided significant effects not demonstrated in the 
analysis using trait anxiety and the first state anxiety measure as 
independent variables. The second anxiety measure was taken immediately 
following the design discrimination task and for this reason, may have 
contributed to significant effects on this dependent measure when aver­
aged xjith the first state anxiety measure. For a few dependent mea­
sures, the use of trait anxiety with arousal condition as independent 
variables provided additional significant effects. In these cases, 
these analyses are presented in addition to those employing trait anxi­
ety and the first state anxiety measure. Arousal condition was a
dichotomous variable.
70
Two additional analyses of variance were performed using extreme 
anxiety groups only. Both trait anxiety and arousal condition were 
dichotomized for these analyses. One group was characterized by high 
trait anxiety/high arousal, the other by low trait anxiety/low arousal. 
One of these extreme group analyses involved a repeated measures compar­
ison with each subject's average score on left hemisphere tasks versus 
his average score for right hemisphere tasks as the within subjects var­
iable (see Table 5). The other extreme group analysis was a repeated 
measures comparison with analytic versus global component of the design 
discrimination task as the within subjects variable (see Table 6). In 
addition to the analyses of variance that have been described, covariant 
analyses were conducted to remove the effects on the independent vari­
ables of uncontrolled factors, such as sex, repression-sensitization, 
social desirability, and eye movements. The covariant analyses were 
performed for each of the dependent measures as well as the averaged 
left hemisphere tasks score and the averaged right hemisphere tasks 
score. Where covariant analysis resulted in additional significant 
effects, these results are presented in the text.
The preceding has been a description of the various analyses 
that were performed. Next, the covariates will be discussed in rela­
tionship to other variables. Then, those statistical analyses resulting 
in significant effects will be discussed for dependent measures
individually.
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Table 5
Summary of Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance with Extreme 
Groups for Averaged Left Hemisphere Versus 
Averaged Right Hemisphere Tasks
Source df MS F £ =
Between Subjects
Trait Anxiety/Arousal Group-
High/High Versus Low/Low (T/A) 1 0.03 0.07 n.s.
Error 26 0.41
Within Subjects
Hemisphericity of Tasks Within Subject (LR) 1 0.53 0.83 n.s.
T/A X LR 1 0.84 1.32 n.s.
Error 26 0.63
Table 6
Summary of Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance with 
Groups for Analytic Versus Global Aspect of 
the Design Discrimination Task
Extreme
Source df MS F £  =
Between Subj ects
Trait Anxiety/Arousal Group
High/High Versus Low/Low (T/A) 1 2.26 0.35 n.s.
Error 26 6.47
Within Subjects
Task Component Within Subject (AG) 1 11.30 1.60 n. s.
T/A X AG 1 25.23 3.56 n.s.
Error 26
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Covariates
The individual difference variables sex, repression- 
sensitization, social desirability, modified repression-sensitization/ 
social desirability, and eye movements were used as covariates. Corre­
lations between the covariates are presented in Table 7. For all analy­
ses, males were scored as 1, females as 2. The correlations between the 
covariates and trait anxiety were: sex 0.12, repression-sensitization 
0.58 (j> = 0.0001), social desirability -0.18, modified repression- 
sensitization 0.55 (_£ = 0.0001), left eye movements -0.25, right move­
ments 0.21, upward movements 0.15, downward movements 0.21, stares -0.05. 
Correlations between the first state anxiety measure and the covariates 
were: sex 0.04, repression-sensitization 0.16, social desirability
0.007, modified repression-sensitization 0.18, left movements -0.06, 
right movements 0.04, upward movements 0.22, downward movements 0.001, 
stares -0.02. Correlations of covariates with the second state anxiety 
measure were: sex -0.10, repression-sensitization 0.30 (j3 = 0.02), 
social desirability 0.03, modified repression-sensitization 0.35 (jd = 
0.007), left movements -0.28 (jd = 0.03), right movements 0.21, upward 
movements 0.04, downward movements 0.05, stares 0.17. Correlations of 
covariates with the mean of the two state anxiety measures were: sex 
-0.03, repression-sensitization 0.25, social desirability 0.02, modified 
repression-sensitization 0.29 (]3 = 0.02), left movements -0.19, right 
movements 0.14, upward movements 0.14, downward movements 0.03, stares 
0.08. Correlations of covariates with arousal condition were: sex 
-0.08, repression-sensitization 0.06, social desirability -0.25,
Table 7
Correlations Between Individual Difference Variables
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Sex -0.15 0.15 -0.13 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 -0.35* 0.17
Repression-
Sensitization -0.15 -0.11 0.86* -0.36* 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.20
Social Desirability 0.15 -0.12 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.13
Modified
Repression- -0.13 0.86* -0.05 -0.17 0.11 0.20 0.10 0.09
Sensitization
Left Eye 
Movements -0.05 -0.36* 0.08 -0.17 -0.89* -0.12 -0.12 -0.25
Right Eye 
Movements 0.07 0.23 -0.03 0.11 -0.89* -0.12 -0.07 -0.16
Upward Eye 
Movements -0.03 0.23 -0.02 0.20 -0.12 -0.12 0.05 0.34*
Downward Eye 
Movements -0.35* 0.16 0.05 0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.05 -0.05
Stares 0.17 0.20 -0.13 0.09 -0.25 -0.16 0.34* -0.05
*£<.05
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modified repression-sensitization 0.05, left movements -0.12, right 
movements -0.05, upward movements 0.11, downward movements -0.003, 
stares 0.14.
Mooney Closure Faces— Number Correct
A review of Table 2 reveals a significant main effect of state 
anxiety on the number of correct responses to the Mooney Closure Faces. 
There was also a significant interactive effect of trait anxiety and 
state anxiety on the number of correct responses on this task. The main 
effect of trait anxiety approached significance in the analyses using 
trait anxiety and first state anxiety measure as independent variables 
and reached significance when arousal condition was used as an indepen­
dent variable in lieu of state anxiety. With the effect of sex removed, 
the effect of arousal condition was significant, _F(1, 55) = 4.49, jd = 
0.04. With the effect of sex removed, the interaction of arousal condi­
tion and trait anxiety was also significant, _F(1, 55) = 4.82, jp = 0.03, 
on the number of correct Mooney Closure Faces. Males gave more correct 
responses (M = 4.52, _n = 23) than did females (M = 3.65, n = 37) on the 
Mooney task. Males were scored as 1, females as 2; the correlation 
between sex and number correct on the Mooney Closure Faces was -0.30, 
jp = 0.02. A review of the group means for correct responses on the 
Mooney task in Table 1 shows a decrease in number of correct responses 
with increased anxiety. Table 8 gives the mean number of correct 
responses on the Mooney task at different levels of trait anxiety and 
under different arousal conditions. These means are in the direction of 
fewer correct responses with increased anxiety and arousal.
Table 8
Mean Number of Correct Responses on the Mooney Closure Faces at Different Levels 
of Trait Anxiety and Under Different Arousal Conditions
Arousal Condition
Low High Total
Dependent
Measure
Trait
Anxiety n M SD n M SD n M SD
Mooney Faces- Low 18 4.06 1.47 16 4.44 0.96 34 4.24 1.26
Correct High 11 3.91 1.45 15 3.47 1.68 26 3.65 1.57
Total 29 4.00 1.44 31 3.97 1.43 60 3.98 1.42
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Mooney Closure Faces— Latencies
Analysis of variance of latency scores for the Mooney Closure 
Faces yielded significant main effects for trait anxiety and for state 
anxiety, and a significant interaction of trait anxiety and state anxi­
ety (see Table 2). Table 1 mean latencies for Mooney task performance 
demonstrate an increase in latency (i.e., impaired performance) with 
increased anxiety.
Averaged Right Hemisphere Tasks
When scores for the two right hemisphere tasks were averaged for 
each subject, analysis of variance (Table 2) demonstrated significant 
effects for trait anxiety, state anxiety and the interaction of trait 
and state anxiety. As indicated in Table 1, mean performance on aver­
aged right hemisphere tasks was negatively affected by anxiety.
Design Discrimination Task— Analytic Aspect
A significant main effect of trait anxiety was demonstrated for 
the analytic aspect of the design discrimination task when trait anxiety 
and the mean of the two state anxiety measures were used as independent 
variables (see Table 2). Table 9 gives the mean number of correct 
responses on the analytic aspect of the design discrimination task at 
different levels of trait anxiety and at different levels of the mean of 
the two state anxiety measures. These means show enhanced performance 
with increased anxiety. With the effect of repression-sensitization 
removed, the main effect of state anxiety on the analytic aspect of the
Table 9
Mean Number of Correct Responses on the Analytic Aspect of the Design Discrimination 
Task at Different Levels of Trait and State Anxiety 
(Mean of Two Measures)
State Anxiety
Dependent
Measure
Trait
Anxiety
Low High Total
n M SD n M SD n M SD
Design Discrimina- Low 22 10.59 2.86 12 11.58 2.19 34 10.94 2.65
tion Task- High 10 12.10 4.82 16 11.44 2.48 26 11.69 3.48
Analytic Aspect Total 32 11.06 3.57 28 11.50 2.32 60 11.27 3.04
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design discrimination task was significant, JF(1, 55) = 4.26, jd = 0.04. 
Mean responses on the analytic aspect of the design discrimination task 
were fewer for higher repression-sensitization scores (M = 10.89, n =
27) than for lower repression-sensitization scores (M = 11.58, n = 33). 
The nonsignificant correlation between repression-sensitization scores 
and performance on the analytic component of the design discrimination 
task was 0.01.
Tonal Memory
No significant main or interactive effects were obtained for 
anxiety measures and tonal memory. However, with the effects of 
repression-sensitization, eye movements to the left, and eye movements 
to the right removed in separate covariate analyses, the effect of trait 
anxiety on tonal memory attained the following significance levels 
respectively: _F(1, 55) = 4.23, = 0.04, _F(1, 55) = 4.56, = 0.04, and
_F(1, 55) = 4.72, _p. = 0.03. With the effects of the same covariates 
removed, the effect on tonal memory performance of the trait anxiety by 
state anxiety interaction was also found to be significant at these 
levels: _F(1, 55) = 4.32, £  = 0.04 (with effect of repression- 
sensitization removed), _F(1, 55) = 4.74, jo = 0.03 (with effect of eye 
movements to the left removed), J7(l, 55) = 4.84, £  = 0.03 (with effect 
of eye movements to the right removed). Correlations between these 
covariates and dependent measures were nonsignificant. Subjects who had 
higher repression-sensitization scores scored lower on tonal memory (M = 
7.67, n = 27) than did subjects who scored lower in repression- 
sensitization (M = 7.91, n = 33). The correlation between repression-
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sensitization scores and tonal memory performance was -0.10. Subjects 
who exhibited greater numbers of left eye movements scored higher (M = 
8.00, n = 28) on tonal memory than did subjects who exhibited fewer left 
eye movements (M = 7.63, n. = 32). The correlation between left eye 
movements and tonal memory was 0.15. The opposite was true for right 
eye movements. For subjects who exhibited greater numbers of right eye 
movements mean tonal memory score was 7.48 (n. = 33) and was 8.19 (n =
27) for subjects who exhibited fewer right eye movements. The correla­
tion between right eye movements and tonal memory was -0.21.
Means relevant to the analysis of variance for tonal memory are 
presented in Table 1. With increased anxiety there was a decline in 
task performance.
Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance—
Averaged Left Hemisphere Tasks Versus 
Averaged Right Hemisphere Tasks
A repeated measures analysis of variance (Table 3, Part A) was 
performed with each subject’s average score on left hemisphere tasks 
versus his average score on right hemisphere tasks as the within sub­
jects variable. This resulted in significant effects on task perfor­
mance for the within subjects comparison. Significant effects were also 
found for the interaction of trait anxiety with the within subjects var­
iable, the interaction of state anxiety with the within subjects vari­
able, and for the interaction of trait anxiety, state anxiety, and the 
within subjects variable. When arousal condition was used in the 
between subjects analysis in lieu of state anxiety (Table 3, Part B), a 
significant main effect was found for trait anxiety.
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Means and standard deviations relevant to these repeated measure 
analyses are presented in Tables 10 and 11. For left hemisphere tasks, 
performance declined with increased anxiety. Similarly performance 
declined on right hemisphere tasks under conditions of increased anxi­
ety. This was the case whether arousal condition or state anxiety was 
used as the independent variable.
In Figure 3 the effects of trait and state anxiety on perfor­
mance scores are graphed for the averaged left hemisphere tasks and for 
the averaged right hemisphere tasks. The graph demonstrates that per­
formance on both left hemisphere tasks and right hemisphere tasks was 
impaired by increased anxiety. However, performance on averaged right 
hemisphere tasks was more negatively affected by increased anxiety than 
was performance on averaged left hemisphere tasks.
Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance—
Analytic Versus Global Aspect of the 
Design Discrimination Task
A repeated measures analysis was also performed for the design 
discrimination task with analytic versus global aspect of the task as 
the within subjects variable (see Table 4, Part A). Here, significant 
effects on task performance were found for the within subjects compari­
son and for the interaction of trait anxiety with the within subjects 
variable. Means and standard deviations relevant to this repeated mea­
sure analysis are provided in Table 12. For the analytic aspect of the 
design discrimination task, performance was enhanced under conditions of 
increased anxiety. For the global aspect of the task, performance 
declined with an increase in anxiety. A significant main effect for
Table 10
Means for Averaged Left Hemisphere Tasks Versus Averaged Right Hemisphere Tasks at Different Levels
of Trait Anxiety and State Anxiety (First Measure)
State Anxiety
Hemisphericity Trait Low High Total
of Tasks Anxiety
n M SD n M SD n M SD
Left Low 22 0.08 0.59 12 -0.03 0.58 34 0.04 0.58
High 12 -0.10 0.76 14 -0.01 0.72 26 -0.05 0.73
Total 34 0.01 0.65 26 -0.02 0.65 60 0.00 0.64
Right Low 22 0.09 0.81 12 0.35 0.35 34 0.18 0.69
High 12 0.08 0.74 14 0.51 0.86 26 -0.24 0.85
Total 34 0.09 0.77 26 0.11 0.79 60 0.00 0.78
Left and Right Low 44 0.08 0.70 24 0.16 0.50 68 0.11 0.63
Combined High 24 -0.01 0.74 28 -0.26 0.82 52 -0.14 0.79
Total 68 0.05 0.71 52 -0.07 0.72 120 0.00 0.71
Table 11
Means for Averaged Left Hemisphere Tasks Versus Averaged Right Hemisphere Tasks at Different Levels
of Trait Anxiety and Arousal
Arousal Condition
Hemisphericity 
of Tasks
Trait
Anxiety
n
Low
M SD n
High
M SD n
Total
M SD
Left Low 18 -0.01 0.61 16 0.10 0.55 34 0.04 0.58
High 11 -0.24 0.76 15 0.08 0.70 26 -0.05 0.73
Total 29 -0.10 0.67 31 0.09 0.62 60 0.00 0.64
Right Low 18 0.07 0.78 16 0.30 0.55 34 0.18 0.69
High 11 -0.07 0.78 15 -0.35 0.90 26 -0.24 0.85
Total 29 0.02 0.77 31 -0.02 0.80 60 0.00 0.78
Left and Right Low 36 0.03 0.70 32 0.20 0.55 68 0.11 0.63
Combined High 22 -0.15 0.76 30 -0.14 0.82 52 -0.14 0.79
Total 58 -0.04 0.72 62 0.04 0.71 120 0.00 0.71
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Figure 3. The effects of trait and state anxiety on averaged left 
hemisphere tasks and averaged right hemisphere tasks.
Table 12
Means for Analytic Versus Global Aspect of the Design Discrimination Task at Different Levels 
of Trait Anxiety and Different Levels of State Anxiety (Mean of Two Measures)
State Anxiety
Task Component
Trait
Anxiety
n
Low
M SD n
High
M SD n
Total
M SD
Analytic Low 22 10.59 2.86 12 11.58 2.19 34 10.94 2.65
High 10 12.10 4.82 16 11.44 2.48 26 11.69 3.48
Total 32 11.06 3.57 28 11.50 2.32 60 11.27 3.04
Global Low 22 12.64 2.17 12 12.25 2.05 34 12.50 2.11
High 10 12.70 2.71 16 11.75 3.11 26 12.12 2.94
Total 32 12.66 2.31 28 11.96 2.67 60 12.33 2.49
Analytic and Low 44 11.61 2.71 24 11.92 2.10 68 11.72 2.50
Global High 20 12.40 3.82 32 11.59 2.77 52 11.90 3.20
Combined Total 64 11.86 3.09 56 11.73 2.49 120 11.80 2.82
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arousal was found in the between subjects analysis when arousal condi­
tion was used in lieu of state anxiety (Table 4, Part B). Means and 
standard deviations relevant to this repeated measures analysis are pro­
vided in Table 13. For the analytic aspect of the task, performance was 
increased with increased anxiety and arousal. For the global aspect of 
the task, increase in the independent variables resulted in a decline in 
performance.
Additional analyses were then conducted to test the effects of 
independent variables on design discrimination task performance with 
individual difference variables covaried out. By removing the effects 
of sex, left eye movements, right eye movements, repression- 
sensitization, and modified repression-sensitization/social desirability 
in separate covariate analyses, a main effect for arousal was obtained 
at the following significance levels respectively: _F(1, 115) = 4.13,
£  - 0.04; F(l, 115) = 4.13, £  = 0.04; F(l, 115) = 4.12, £  = 0.04; F(l, 
115) = 4.47, £ = 0.04; _F(1, 115) = 4.72, £ = 0.03. All correlations 
between these covariates and dependent measures were nonsignificant. 
Males performed better than females on the analytic aspect of the design 
discrimination task (M = 11.43, £  = 23; M = 11.16, £  = 37 respectively). 
Numerical designation for males was 1 and for females was 2. The corre­
lation between sex and performance on the analytic component of the task 
was -0.04. Males also performed better than females on the global 
aspect of the task (M = 12.43, £  = 23 for males; M = 12.27, £  = 37 for 
females). On the global task component the correlation between sex and 
performance was -0.03. On the analytic aspect of the task subjects who 
exhibited greater numbers of left eye movements had higher task scores
Table 13
Means for Analytic Versus Global Aspect of the Design Discrimination Task at 
Different Levels of Trait Anxiety and Under Different Arousal Conditions
Arousal Condition
Task Trait Low High Total
Component Anxiety n M SD n M SD n M SD
Analytic Low 18 10.00 2.89 16 12.00 1.93 34 10.94 2.65
High 11 11.82 4.71 15 11.60 2.41 26 11.69 3.48
Total 29 10.69 3.71 31 11.81 2.15 60 11.27 3.04
Global Low 18 12.44 2.12 16 12.56 2.16 34 12.50 2.11
High 11 12.27 2.65 15 12.00 3.23 26 12.11 2.94
Total 29 12.38 2.29 31 12.29 2.70 60 12.33 2.49
Analytic and Global Low 36 11.22 2.79 32 12.28 2.04 68 11.72 2.50
Combined High 22 12.05 3.73 30 11.80 2.81 52 11.90 3.20
Total 58 11.53 3.17 62 12.05 2.43 120 11.80 2.81
87
(M = 11.46, _n = 28) than did subjects who exhibited fewer left eye move­
ments (M = 11.09, _n = 32). The correlation between left eye movements 
and performance on analytic task component was -0.05. The same held 
true for the global aspect of the task; subjects who exhibited greater 
numbers of left eye movements obtained higher scores (M = 12.46, n = 28) 
than did subjects who exhibited fewer left eye movements (M = 12.22, n. = 
32). A correlation of -0.05 was present between performance on global 
aspect of the design discrimination task and left eye movements. The 
relationship between right eye movements and analytic response scores 
was in the opposite direction. Those subjects who exhibited more right 
eye movements made fewer (M = 11.18, n = 33) correct responses on this 
task component than did subjects who exhibited fewer numbers of right 
eye movements (M = 11.37, n = 27). Correlation between right eye move­
ments and performance on the analytic component of the task was 0.06. 
However, for the global task component subjects demonstrating greater 
numbers of right eye movements had a higher rate of correct responding 
(M = 12.39, n. = 33) than did subjects who made fewer right eye movements 
(M = 12.26, n. = 27). The correlation between right eye movements and 
scores on the global component was 0.05. For the analytic task compo­
nent subjects scoring higher on repression-sensitization, that is, at 
the sensitization end of the scale, had lower task scores (M = 10.89, 
n = 27) than did subjects who scored at the lower, repression end of the 
scale (M = 11.56, n. = 33). The correlation between repression- 
sensitization scores and analytic task performance was 0.03. For global 
task component, subjects with higher repression-sensitization scores had 
lower task scores (M = 11.89, n = 27) than did subjects with lower
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repression-sensitization scores (M = 12.70, n = 33). The correlation 
between repression-sensitization scores and global component scores was 
-0.01. Subjects with higher scores on modified repression-sensitization/ 
social desirability had lower analytic task component scores (M = 10.89, 
_n = 27) than did subjects with lower scores on the modified scale (M = 
11.58, n. = 33). The correlation between this modified individual dif­
ference measure and analytic performance was -0.10. On global task com­
ponent the mean number of correct responses for subjects with higher 
modified scores was 11.89 (n = 27) while mean number of correct 
responses for subjects with lower scores was 12.70 (n = 33). The corre­
lation between the modified repression-sensitization/social desirability 
measure and global component performance was -0.12.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The following experimental hypotheses were derived from the 
neuropsychological model of repression proposed in the first chapter:
(a) that performance on left hemisphere tasks would be more adversely 
affected by anxiety than would performance on right hemisphere tasks;
(b) that performance on the analytic aspect of the combined task would 
be hampered more by anxiety than would performance on the global aspect. 
These hypotheses were not supported by research findings. To the con­
trary, findings were opposite to those predicted and, as such, do not 
lend support to the proposed neuropsychological model for repression.
For two of the dependent measures, Mooney Closure Faces and 
tonal memory, performance decreased with higher levels of anxiety. Both 
of these were right hemisphere tasks. The repeated measures analysis of 
averaged left hemisphere tasks versus averaged right hemisphere tasks 
revealed that under conditions of increased anxiety, decline in perfor­
mance was significantly greater for right hemisphere tasks than for left 
hemisphere tasks.
Also opposite to prediction, performance on the global aspect of 
the design discrimination task showed a nonsignificant decline with 
increased anxiety while performance on the analytic aspect of the task 
significantly increased with higher levels of anxiety. The repeated
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measures analysis using analytic versus global component of the task as 
the within subjects variable demonstrated that the difference in direc­
tion of findings for the analytic and global task components was signif­
icant.
The individual difference variables studied, including sex, 
repression-sensitization, social desirability, modified repression- 
sensitization/social desirability, and eye movements had very little 
direct relationship to task performance. However, a few important 
inter-relationships between individual difference variables were noted 
and will be commented on later in the discussion.
Findings of the present research suggest improved left hemi­
sphere and impaired right hemisphere function with increased anxiety. 
This would indicate that higher levels of anxiety result in a shift in 
cognitive approach from right hemisphere perception and processing to 
left hemisphere cognition.
While findings do not support the proposed model for repression, 
they are relevant to the body of data regarding the relative contribu­
tions of the two hemispheres to emotion and the neuropsychological 
interrelationship of cognition and emotion. Tucker et al. (1978) found 
that higher trait anxiety was associated with a right ear auditory 
attentional bias and a decrease in left eye movements. The results can 
be taken to indicate the presence in trait anxious subjects of an over- 
activated left hemisphere which inhibits right hemisphere function. The 
model of reciprocal inhibition of function, suggested here and espoused 
by Kinsbourne (1970), can be offered as one explanation for the findings 
of the present study. Increased anxiety may have served to activate and
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prime the left hemisphere, resulting in improved analytic task perfor­
mance. The activated left hemisphere may have concurrently inhibited 
right hemisphere function resulting in the decreased performance on 
right hemisphere tasks. Tucker et al. (1978), in another experiment, 
found higher state anxiety to be associated with more errors in the 
right visual half-field, particularly for verbal material. The present 
study found improved rather than impaired left hemisphere performance.
The discrepancy may be due to the fact that Tucker et al. used only 
those individuals as research subjects who scored extremely high or low 
(one standard deviation above or below the mean) on state anxiety. If 
more extreme state anxiety scores had been employed in the present study, 
perhaps a drop in performance would have occurred at higher anxiety 
levels.
An alternative explanation for the present findings may be 
couched in terms of induced cognitive set. Shearer (1978) found that 
subjects who were asked to attempt to inhibit emotional arousal, 
reported using verbal, analytical thinking as an inhibitory strategy. 
Tucker and Newman (in press) assessed the efficacy of analytic, verbal 
thinking versus global, imaginal thinking as arousal mediating strate­
gies and found the former to be a more successful strategy in inhibiting 
arousal. In the present study, under the high arousal condition, sub­
jects were told that they would become quite anxious. This warning may 
have triggered coping strategies which, according to the research just 
cited, would be more likely to involve the adoption of an analytic, ver­
bal cognitive demeanor. If this were the case, these subjects, already
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thinking analytically, would be more apt to perform well on analytic 
left hemisphere tasks and poorly on right hemisphere tasks.
The foregoing is relevant to a discussion of possible differ­
ences in influence associated with trait and state anxiety. A main 
effect of trait anxiety was found for the Mooney Closure Faces task, 
tonal memory, the averaged right hemisphere tasks, and the analytic com­
ponent of the design discrimination task. It is possible that trait 
anxiety does not have a direct influence on task performance but rather 
typifies a personality type that tends to exhibit a left hemisphere cog­
nitive style. Trait anxiety correlates .58 with repression- 
sensitization in the present study and indicates a tendency toward emo­
tional arousal in trait anxious subjects. These individuals may devel- 
opmentally adopt a cognitive strategy of verbal analysis to cope with 
the tendency toward over-arousal, so that it is the cognitive style of 
trait anxious subjects, rather than trait anxiety per se, that influ­
ences task performance. Significant main effects were also shown for 
state anxiety for the Mooney task, averaged right hemisphere tasks and 
analytic component of the design discrimination task and may represent a 
more direct influence on task performance.
In evaluating the present study, attention should be directed to 
the state dependent memory literature (e.g., Bartlett & Santrock, 1979). 
Studies in this area have shown that memory is impaired if encoding and 
retrieval occur under different states. In the present study, retrieval 
immediately followed encoding in the tasks that contained memory as a 
task element. As a result, both proceeded under the same state. In 
future experiments in the area of repression, investigators might wish
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to vary state for encoding and retrieval in order to determine if this 
would interact with differential hemispheric function to produce 
repression.
An evaluation of the interrelationships of cognitive style and 
emotion has provided the most viable approach to the study of repression 
to date. Smokier and Shevrin (1979) noted that qualities typifying a 
hysterical personality style (repression of disturbing ideas, emotional 
lability, a concrete cognitive approach) are consistent with data 
regarding right hemisphere functioning whereas obsessive compulsive 
traits (inhibition of affect, use of an ideational, analytic cognitive 
approach) are consistent with data regarding left hemisphere function­
ing. Consistent with this they found individuals exhibiting a hysteri­
cal style to demonstrate more left looking and obsessives to demonstrate 
more right looking. Congruent with their findings, the present study 
found a correlation of -0.36 between left eye movements and repression- 
sensitization, indicating that left movers tend to score at the 
repression end of the scale.
It should be emphasized that the approach of Smokier and Shevrin 
was aimed at repressive style rather than repression in the sense that 
the present study had endeavored to neuropsychologically explicate. The 
present study had sought to clarify the nature of the repression of 
unconscious instinctual conflictual wishes which, according to psycho­
dynamic theory, is an integral part of the psychological functioning of 
all individuals, not simply those individuals who adopt a repressive 
style. The neuropsychological dimensions of this more common repression 
may be quite different from those of repressive style and warrant
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further investigations. On the other hand, repression as a means to 
keep unconscious conflicts from awareness may be an outmoded construct 
so that repression as a function of cognitive style may prove to be the 
only viable instance of this phenomenon.
In order to better evaluate repression in terms of neuropsycho­
logical function, it may be necessary to abandon an analogue approach. 
One reason for doing so, is the fact that in repression the anxiety that 
triggers the defense is not consciously experienced if the repression is 
successful. The effects of this type of anxiety could be categorically 
different in a neuropsychological sense from the anxiety induced experi­
mentally that is consciously felt. The transition from analogue to 
clinical research would be complex but might prove more valuable in 
understanding the nature of repression as it relates to differential
hemisphere functioning.
APPENDIX A
Practice Trial*
On the first day of September, Ninnis and Mertz took a team to 
the ridge to deposit bags of food for the next journey. They allowed 
the huskies to run loose and then tried to coax them to run back to the 
hut with the sledge. The case, however, was some sort of inexplicable 
magnet to the dogs.
Experimental Trial 1*
I was playing in a joint on the town square in Tuscaloosa, and 
right outside there was this little boy about 12 or 13 who was selling 
watermelons, only every time you turned around, this little fella had 
deserted the watermelon stand and was sneaking in the poolroom, but the 
owner, a Mr. McHenry, who . . .
Experimental Trial 2*
The increased field of subject matter presented in the inter­
mediate grades, far from a burden, should provide an opportunity for 
exploration into many facets of human experience and an awareness of the 
interaction of all areas of study with each other, with life itself, and 
with one’s own personality. Obviously, the pupil will at this stage 
come into contact with subject matter about which he has never expressed 
interest and with which he has had no previous experience. The factor 
of readiness to read therefore becomes of paramount importance and 
receives a degree of emphasis at least equal to that which it requires 
at the preparational stages in laying the ground work for the initial 
schoolwork.
*Note: Verbs are underlined above but were not underlined when
stimulus materials were presented during the experiment.
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